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1 
INVESTOR PROTECTION MEETS THE FEDERAL 
ARBITRATION ACT 
Barbara Black* and Jill I. Gross** 
ABSTRACT 
In the past three decades, most recently in AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion, the United States Supreme Court has advanced an aggressive pro-
arbitration campaign, transforming the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) into a 
powerful source of anti-consumer substantive arbitration law. In the aftermath of 
AT&T Mobility, which upheld a prohibition on class actions in a consumer 
contract despite state law that refused to enforce such provisions on 
unconscionability grounds, efforts have been made to prohibit investors from 
bringing class actions or joining claims, including claims under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act). In the most egregious example to date, 
the broker-dealer Charles Schwab & Co. (Schwab) revised its customer account 
agreements to prohibit class actions and joinder of claims. When the Financial 
Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), the self-regulatory organization for 
broker-dealers, brought a disciplinary action against Schwab, claiming the 
revision violated FINRA rules, the broker-dealer sued FINRA, asserting that the 
FAA requires enforcement of its arbitration agreement. This confrontation 
provides a concrete opportunity to analyze how courts should resolve conflicts 
between the FAA and federal regulatory statutes designed to protect certain 
segments of the public, in this case, investors. 
This Article addresses whether the FAA limits the ability of federal 
regulators acting pursuant to Congressional authority to impose conditions and 
limitations on the use of arbitration provisions in order to ensure fairness. In this 
Article, we summarize current Supreme Court FAA jurisprudence that establishes 
a strong national pro-arbitration policy. We then describe the Exchange Act’s 
regulation of arbitration involving broker-dealers, specifically the authority 
delegated to the SEC and FINRA to regulate the content of arbitration clauses in 
broker-dealer/customer contracts and the Exchange Act’s anti-waiver provision 
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barring any condition that forces investors to waive compliance with any part of 
the Exchange Act, its rules and SRO rules. After detailing the current regulatory 
dispute between Schwab and FINRA over Schwab’s inclusion of a class action 
waiver in its customer agreement, we argue that courts should resolve the conflict 
between the FAA and the Exchange Act by applying the Exchange Act over the 
FAA through the long-standing doctrine of implied repeal, additional well-
accepted canons of statutory construction, and current Exchange Act and FAA 
jurisprudence. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The United States Supreme Court, in advancing an aggressive pro-
arbitration campaign since the mid-1980s, transformed the Federal Arbitration 
Act (FAA)1—enacted in 1925 and not amended materially since then—from a 
statute that forbids judicial discrimination against arbitration agreements to a 
powerful source of anti-consumer substantive arbitration law.2 Whether the 
 
 1.  9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006). 
 2.  Professor David Schwartz argues that the Court’s decisions have converted the 
FAA into a “radical claim-suppressing statute.” David S. Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing 
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FAA is powerful enough to thwart the equally powerful and more recently 
reaffirmed federal policy of investor protection embodied in the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act)3 remains an open issue the Court has 
not yet faced. 
Primarily through the FAA preemption doctrine,4 the Court has struck 
down consumer-protective state laws that regulate arbitration agreements. In 
Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Cassarotto,5 the Court held the FAA preempted a 
state statute that “singl[ed] out arbitration provisions for suspect status”6 
because it required contracts containing an arbitration clause to include 
prominent notice of the clause on the front page of the contract. Fifteen years 
later, in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,7 the Court upheld a provision in a 
consumer contract that disallowed class arbitration, finding the FAA preempted 
state precedent8 that refused to enforce class arbitration waivers on 
unconscionability grounds. Strikingly, the Court found that the FAA preempted 
the state precedent even though it applied equally to waivers of class claims in 
court and in arbitration because, according to the Court, the “overarching 
purpose of the FAA . . . is to ensure the enforcement of arbitration agreements 
according to their terms so as to facilitate streamlined proceedings.”9 
Accordingly, corporations can not only require consumers of their products and 
services to arbitrate their disputes in a forum of the corporation’s choice, they 
can also block consumers from aggregating their claims in court or in 
arbitration. Moreover, the corporation does not have to highlight the arbitration 
provision or in any way call it to consumers’ attention. 
Both Cassarotto and Concepcion involved conflicts between the FAA and 
state law. Subsequently, the Court, in CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood,10 
reaffirmed the principle that parties may agree to arbitrate claims arising under 
a federal statute so long as the statute does not contain a “‘contrary 
congressional command.’”11 Although this was nothing more than a statement 
of the law in effect since Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon,12 some 
 
Arbitration: The New Rules, 87 IND. L.J. 239, 240 (2012). 
 3.  15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78pp (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 4.  See infra notes 71-77 and accompanying text. 
 5.  517 U.S. 681 (1996). 
 6.  Id. at 687. 
 7.  131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 8.  Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005) (holding that 
class action waivers in consumer contracts of adhesion are unconscionable “in a setting in 
which disputes between the contracting parties predictably involve small amounts of 
damages”), abrogated by AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 9.  AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1748. 
 10.  132 S. Ct. 665 (2012). 
 11.  Id. at 669 (quoting Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 
(1987)). 
 12.  482 U.S. 220 (1987) (holding that arbitration provisions in brokerage contracts are 
enforceable with respect to claims under the Exchange Act); see also Rodriguez de Quijas v. 
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interpreted CompuCredit as a statement of FAA supremacy over other federal 
statutes,13 setting the stage for a confrontation between the policies of the FAA 
and the countervailing policies of other federal laws. In particular, those 
seeking to limit the ability of investors to bring class actions assert that the 
FAA requires the enforcement of arbitration agreements with class action 
waivers in all instances.14 The broker-dealer Charles Schwab & Co. (Schwab) 
recently made this argument in challenging the arbitration rules of the Financial 
Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), the self-regulatory organization 
(SRO) for broker-dealers.15 
Virtually all brokerage firms include provisions in their standard-form 
customer agreements requiring arbitration of customers’ disputes in the FINRA 
forum.16 These customers, like other consumers of products and services, may 
have disputes against their broker-dealers that are more efficiently handled if 
they are aggregated and indeed may not be feasible to pursue otherwise.17 In 
fall 2011, only a few months after AT&T Mobility, Schwab amended its 
customer agreement to require its brokerage customers to waive their rights to 
bring class actions in court and even to prevent arbitrators from consolidating 
similar claims submitted by a discrete number of customers.18 According to 
Schwab, “it acted to protect its shareholders and customers from the high costs 
 
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (holding that arbitration provisions in 
brokerage contracts are enforceable with respect to claims arising under the Securities Act of 
1933). 
 13.  See, e.g., Opinion from Cyril Moscow, Esq., to Office of Chief Counsel, Div. of 
Corp. Fin., U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n (SEC) (Jan. 12, 2012) (asserting that in 
CompuCredit the Court was “emphatic that general anti-waiver provisions, such as the one 
in section 29(a) [of the Exchange Act], are not a barrier to the enforcement of an arbitration 
provision pursuant to the FAA”) (on file with authors). 
 14.  Id. (asserting that AT&T Mobility makes clear that “class actions are not essential 
to the vindication of statutory rights”). 
 15.  Until mid-2007, the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) and 
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) ran separate arbitration forums that handled a 
combined 99% of all securities arbitrations in the country. On July 30, 2007, NASD and 
NYSE Regulation, including their respective arbitration forums, consolidated and formed 
FINRA. See Press Release, Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., NASD and NYSE Member 
Regulation Combine to Form the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (July 30, 2007), 
available at http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2007/P036329. Today, 
FINRA’s dispute resolution arm administers virtually all arbitrations of securities disputes. 
See Dispute Resolution, Arbitration and Mediation, http://www.finra.org/Arbitration 
AndMediation/ (last visited May 30, 2012). Throughout this Article, we will refer to the 
SRO as NASD for pre-merger events and FINRA for post-merger events. 
 16.  See Jill I. Gross, The End of Mandatory Securities Arbitration?, 30 PACE L. REV. 
1174, 1180 (2010). 
 17.  For an extended discussion of the impact of AT&T Mobility on small claims 
arbitration for consumers and investors, see Jill Gross, AT&T Mobility and the Future of 
Small Claims Arbitration, 41 SW. U. L. REV. 47 (2012). 
 18.  Complaint and Request for Expedited Hearing ¶¶ 1-2, Dept. of Enforcement v. 
Charles Schwab & Co., FINRA Disciplinary Proceeding No. 2011029760201 (Feb. 1, 2012), 
available at http://disciplinaryactions.finra.org/viewdocument.aspx?DocNB=29288. 
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and inefficiencies associated with customer class actions.”19 FINRA promptly 
instituted a disciplinary action against Schwab, charging it with violating 
FINRA Conduct Rules that barred Schwab’s amendment.20 In turn, Schwab 
sued FINRA in federal district court, seeking a declaration that the FAA bars 
FINRA from enforcing its rules regulating broker-dealers’ arbitration 
agreements.21 A magistrate judge dismissed Schwab’s complaint for failure to 
exhaust its administrative remedies without addressing the merits.22 Schwab 
did not appeal the dismissal and indicated that it will not enforce the class 
action waiver until the FINRA disciplinary action is final.23 
The typical consumer contract containing a predispute arbitration 
agreement (PDAA) differs in a number of important ways from a brokerage 
agreement containing a PDAA. Since McMahon, FINRA, with prodding from 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), has engaged in ongoing 
review and reform of its arbitration rules in order to make the arbitration 
process fairer for investors.24 Under the Exchange Act, FINRA’s rules are 
subject to SEC review and approval: the SEC must approve FINRA’s rules, 
after a public comment period, if it finds they are consistent with the 
requirements of the Exchange Act and are designed to protect investors and the 
public interest.25 FINRA rules require broker-dealers to alert customers to the 
inclusion of a PDAA in the customer agreement and to provide information 
about the arbitration process and, in particular, how it differs from court.26 
Besides disclosure, FINRA also regulates the arbitration process to a 
 
 19.  Complaint for Declaratory and Preliminary and Permanent Injunctive Relief ¶ 25, 
Charles Schwab & Co. v. Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., Inc., 861 F. Supp. 2d 1063 (N.D. 
Cal. 2012) (No. CV 12-0518). 
 20.  See Complaint and Request for Expedited Hearing, FINRA Disciplinary 
Proceeding, supra note 18. 
 21.  See Complaint for Declaratory and Preliminary and Permanent Injunctive Relief, 
supra note 19. 
 22.  Charles Schwab & Co., 861 F. Supp. 2d 1063. Schwab did not file a Notice of 
Appeal within the requisite time. 
 23.  Schwab to Hold Off Enforcing Class Action Waivers, WESTLAW J. CLASS ACTION, 
June 21, 2012, at 1 (reporting that Schwab spokesperson announced the company “does not 
have plans to enforce the waiver until the FINRA matter is resolved”). 
 24.  See Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Making It Up as They Go Along: The Role of 
Law in Securities Arbitration, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 991, 999-1005 (2002) (describing post-
McMahon reforms); Jill I. Gross, McMahon Turns Twenty: The Regulation of Fairness in 
Securities Arbitration, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 493, 514-17 (2008) (describing SEC’s robust 
oversight of FINRA’s arbitration process and FINRA’s frequent reforms of its codes of 
arbitration procedure). 
 25.  Exchange Act §§ 15A(b)(6), 19(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o-3(b)(6), 78s(b)(2) (2006). 
 26.  The PDAA must be highlighted and immediately preceded by certain information 
about the arbitration process, in particular how it differs from court. In addition, the 
customer agreement must include a highlighted statement immediately preceding the 
signature line that the agreement contains a PDAA and identifying its location in the 
agreement. FINRA R. 2268(a)-(c) (2011), available at http://finra.complinet.com/en 
/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=9955. 
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degree that commercial arbitration forums may not27 and prohibits firms from 
placing any condition in a PDAA that limits or contradicts any FINRA rule.28 
Notably, FINRA does not permit class arbitrations in its forum because it views 
courts as better equipped to handle complex procedures.29 FINRA, however, 
does permit, under certain circumstances, multiple claimants to combine claims 
containing common questions of law and fact in the same arbitration.30 In 
contrast to typical consumer agreements like the one at issue in AT&T Mobility, 
FINRA does not permit brokerage agreements to contain prohibitions on 
judicial class actions.31 Accordingly, customers that have claims against a 
brokerage firm suitable for class action treatment are permitted to institute a 
class action in court,32 and the firm cannot enforce the PDAA against a 
 
 27.  For example, under the FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer 
Disputes, FINRA R. 12000-12905 (2011), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups 
/arbitrationmediation/@arbmed/@arbion/documents/arbmed/p117546.pdf [hereinafter 
FINRA CUSTOMER CODE], the location of the hearing is determined by the investor’s 
residence (R. 12213), extensive document discovery is permitted, and time-consuming and 
costly depositions are discouraged (R. 12505-12513), and costly and potentially forum-
prohibitive dispositive motions are stringently limited (R. 12504). Perhaps most 
significantly, the forum subsidizes or even waives investors’ forum fees. See Capital 
Markets Regulatory Reform: Strengthening Investor Protection, Enhancing Oversight of 
Private Pools of Capital, and Creating a National Insurance Office: Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on Fin. Serv., 111th Cong. 183 (2009) (testimony of Richard Ketchum, Chairman & 
CEO, FINRA) (stating that “FINRA-registered firms pay for most arbitration costs and 
FINRA waives fees for individuals experiencing financial hardship”); see also FINRA 
CUSTOMER CODE R. 12901. 
 28.  FINRA R. 2268(d)(1). 
 29.  FINRA CUSTOMER CODE R. 12204 (2008). 
 30.  FINRA CUSTOMER CODE R. 12312(a) (if the claims assert any right to relief jointly 
and severally or the claims arise out of the same transaction or occurrence or series of 
transactions and occurrences). The Director or the panel may separate the claims into two or 
more arbitrations. CUSTOMER CODE R. 12312(b). In addition, the Director has the discretion 
to combine separate but related claims into one arbitration, subject to the panel’s 
reconsideration upon motion of a party. CUSTOMER CODE R. 12314. 
 31.  FINRA R. 2268(d)(3). 
 32.  Customers may bring federal securities fraud class actions under Rule 10b-5, 
alleging that the broker-dealer made material misstatements to a class of customers, so long 
as they can plead scienter with the specificity required by the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). See, e.g., Pearce v. UBS Paine Webber, Inc., No. 3:02-
2409-17, 2003 WL 25518056 (D.S.C. Nov. 4, 2003) (complaint alleging hidden 
commissions survived motion to dismiss). If plaintiffs’ complaint survives the pleading 
stage, they may encounter difficulty in establishing scienter and materiality. See, e.g., 
Feinman v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 84 F.3d 539 (2d Cir. 1996) (alleged 
misrepresentation that handling charge was related to actual costs was not material). 
Alternatively, customers may bring class actions against their broker-dealer on a variety 
of state law claims, including negligence, breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty, so 
long as the claims are not precluded by the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 
1998 (SLUSA), Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 15 U.S.C.). Customers have difficulty establishing breach of contract claims 
because brokerage contracts typically give broker-dealers broad discretion. See, e.g., Appert 
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member of the class so long as the class action appears viable.33 
For example, purchasers of a Schwab mutual fund, the YieldPlus Fund, 
brought class actions against Charles Schwab entities, including the broker-
dealer, alleging that they misrepresented the risk profile and assets of the fund 
and improperly changed the fund’s investment policies. Plaintiffs alleged that 
the defendants issued, underwrote and distributed the shares in violation of 
federal securities and state laws.34 Because a number of the investors had 
brokerage accounts with Schwab, if the Schwab arbitration language had been 
in effect and were enforceable, they would have been required to arbitrate 
individual claims. At least for investors whose damages were small, this would 
not be an optimal outcome. In approving the class action settlement, the court 
noted that the resolution offered “substantial recoveries” that “will provide real 
benefits” to the investors.35 The average estimated settlement payment in the 
federal action was $881,36 an amount that would not have made individual 
arbitration feasible. 
Schwab is not the only firm that has attempted, in the wake of AT&T 
Mobility, to limit investors’ access to courts. In early 2012, Carlyle Group LP 
amended a registration statement it filed with the SEC for an initial public 
offering of its limited partnership units to disclose that the Carlyle partnership 
agreement would require investors to arbitrate all disputes with the LP, 
including federal securities claims. It also would provide that investors may 
only bring claims in their individual capacities, arbitrators could not 
consolidate claims, and the proceedings, including any awards, were 
confidential.37 Carlyle stated that it included the provision because it believed 
“that arbitrating claims would be more efficient, cost effective and beneficial to 
 
v. Morgan Stanley, 673 F.3d 609 (7th Cir. 2012) (contract did not require that handling 
charge be tied to actual costs); Green v. Ameritrade, Inc., No. A-05-651, 2007 WL 1599708 
(Neb. Ct. App. June 5, 2007) (summary judgment for defendant on claim it failed to provide 
“real time” quotes on website). 
 33.  FINRA CUSTOMER CODE R. 12204(d). 
 34.  In re Charles Schwab Sec. Litig., 257 F.R.D. 534 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
 35.  In re Charles Schwab Sec. Litig., No. C08-01510 WHA, 2011 WL 1481424, at *5 
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2011). 
 36.  Id. It has been suggested that one possible impetus for Schwab’s insertion of a 
class action waiver in its customer PDAA was its experience with the YieldPlus class action 
litigation and collateral arbitrations. See Richard P. Ryder, Class Action Waivers and 
Arbitration Agreements, SECURITIES ARBITRATION COMMENTATOR 1, Oct. 2011 (reporting 
cost to Schwab of Schwab Yield Plus class action settlement, which dwarfed the cost of the 
arbitrations and the small claims resolved in-house). 
 37.  THE CARLYLE GROUP L.P., AMENDMENT NO. 2 TO FORM S-1 REGISTRATION 
STATEMENT PURSUANT TO THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933, at 287 (Jan. 10, 2012), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1527166/000095012312000638/w83442a2sv1za.ht
m; see Steven M. Davidoff, Carlyle Readies an Unfriendly I.P.O. for Shareholders, N.Y. 
TIMES DEALBOOK (Jan. 18, 2012, 3:19 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/01/18/ 
carlyle-readies-an-unfriendly-i-p-o-for-shareholders (stating that the provisions essentially 
eliminate the investors’ ability to sue the board). 
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our unit holders.”38 The SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance (Corp Fin), 
which has a longstanding position that arbitration provisions in publicly-traded 
issuer’s governance documents violate federal securities laws, reacted with 
displeasure,39 as did several members of Congress.40 Carlyle subsequently 
announced that it was dropping the arbitration provision, so as not to delay the 
offering.41 
As a third example of recent attempts to limit investors’ access to courts, in 
spring 2012, shareholders sought to include in the proxy statements of four 
publicly-traded corporations identical proposals to amend the bylaws to require 
arbitration of all shareholders’ claims, including federal securities claims, and 
to bar class actions.42 The proponents explained that adoption of the proposal 
would be beneficial because “[l]awyer driven class actions impose large 
burdens on corporations without meaningful benefits to shareholders. . . . 
Requiring arbitration on an individual basis should reduce such abuses.”43 
Pfizer Inc.44 and Gannett Co.45 sought and obtained no-action letters from the 
SEC to keep the proposals off their proxy statements.46 The SEC’s Corp Fin, in 
the cryptic language typical of no-action responses, “note[d] that there appears 
to be some basis for your view that implementation of the proposal would 
cause the company to violate the federal securities laws.”47 The proposal also 
appeared in proxy statements of Google48 and Frontier Communications49 
 
 38.  Yin Wilczek, Carlyle Drops Mandatory Arbitration Clause; SEC Says Inclusion 
Would Have Delayed IPO, BLOOMBERG BNA SECURITIES LAW DAILY, Feb. 6, 2012. 
 39.  Letter from the SEC Div. of Corp. Fin. to Jeffrey W. Ferguson, Gen. Counsel, The 
Carlyle Group L.P. (Feb. 3, 2012) (on file with authors) (stating that Corp Fin “does not 
anticipate that it will exercise its delegated authority to accelerate the effective date of your 
registration statement if your limited partnership agreement includes such a provision. . . .”). 
 40.  Letter from Senators Al Franken, Richard Blumenthal, and Robert Menendez to 
SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro (Feb. 3, 2012) (on file with authors) (urging the SEC to 
maintain its policy of opposing provisions mandating arbitration of shareholder disputes in 
governance documents of public companies). 
 41.  See Wilczek, supra note 38. 
 42.  The proposed amendment would not apply to appraisal proceedings and large 
individual claims (over $3 million) and would only apply prospectively. See, e.g., FRONTIER 
COMMUNICATIONS CORP., SCHEDULE 14A: PROXY STATEMENT PURSUANT TO SECTION 14(A) 
OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, at 44 (Mar. 26, 2012), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/20520/000093041312001787/c68718_def14a.htm#
c68718_stockholder2. 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Pfizer Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 WL 587597 (Feb. 22, 2012). 
 45.  Gannett Co., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2011 WL 6859124 (Feb. 22, 2012). 
 46.  The proponents for all four proposals were represented by a Michigan attorney 
(Cyril Moscow), who is an adjunct professor at the University of Michigan Law School, and 
Professor of Law Adam Pritchard provided an opinion on the legality of the provision under 
Delaware law and the inapplicability of Exchange Act § 29(a). 
 47.  Pfizer Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 WL 587597 (Feb. 22, 2012). 
 48.  GOOGLE INC., SCHEDULE 14A: PROXY STATEMENT PURSUANT TO SECTION 14(A) OF 
THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, at 103 (May 9, 2012), available at 
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without management’s endorsement and failed to garner substantial shareholder 
support.50 
Several influential academics contend that AT&T Mobility and 
CompuCredit permit public companies to prohibit investors’ aggregation of 
claims in customer agreements and shareholder documents.51 Although the 
Carlyle and shareholder proposals mentioned above are now off the table and 
thus present no controversy ripe for adjudication, the issue is certainly not dead, 
and it is likely that other issuers will brave public criticism and challenge the 
SEC’s opposition to class waivers at some time in the future. 
Meanwhile, the Schwab-FINRA controversy seems unlikely to settle. 
There is no question that Schwab has agreements with its customers that 
require arbitration of customers’ disputes, the terms of these agreements are 
regulated pursuant to FINRA rules, and FINRA rules are, in turn, subject to 
SEC approval under the Exchange Act. 52 FINRA wants to uphold its rules, and 
Schwab appears determined to fight FINRA, perhaps ultimately to the Supreme 
Court.53 Thus, the Schwab dispute presents a concrete conflict54 between the 
 
http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000119312512222158/d320628ddef14a.htm. 
 49.  See FRONTIER COMMUNICATIONS CORP., SCHEDULE 14A PROXY STATEMENT, supra 
note 42. 
 50.  FRONTIER COMMUNICATIONS CORP., CURRENT REPORT ON FORM 8-K item 5.07 
(May 14, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/20520/000002052 
012000043/votingresults.htm; GOOGLE INC., CURRENT REPORT ON FORM 8-K, item 5.07 (June 
26, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/0001193125122 
83173/d357265d8k.htm. 
 51.  Professor Adam C. Pritchard, University of Michigan Law School, has stated that 
the SEC’s no-action position in Gannett and Pfizer ignores Supreme Court precedent. See 
The Curious Case of Carlyle . . . and Efforts to Shut Down Investor Access to Courts, 
SECURITIES DOCKET (Apr. 18, 2012), https://www.brighttalk.com/webcast/513/44957. 
Professor John C. Coffee, Jr., Columbia Law School, states that “opponents must face the 
sad fact that the battle has already been lost with respect to Carlyle’s ability to limit investors 
to suits based on ‘“negative value’” claims.” John C. Coffee, Jr., The Death of Stockholder 
Litigation?, NAT’L L.J. (Feb. 13, 2012), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp? 
id=1202541959250. Professor Hal Scott, Harvard Law School, states that investors should 
not be “deprived of the opportunity to decide upon the dispute-resolution procedure they 
preferred.” Hal Scott & Leslie N. Silverman, The Alternative to Shareholder Class Actions, 
WALL ST. J. ONLINE (Apr. 1, 2012, 5:48 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014 
24052702303816504577312373860495762.html. 
 52.  In contrast, in the Carlyle and shareholder proposal disputes, there are additional 
complex and unresolved legal questions, principally whether provisions in corporate 
governance documents constitute arbitration agreements under the FAA and whether they 
are enforceable under applicable state corporate law. See Barbara Black, Arbitration of 
Investors’ Claims Against Issuers: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 107 (2012); Barbara Black, Eliminating Securities Fraud Class Actions Under the 
Radar, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 802. 
 53. Appeals from FINRA disciplinary actions are heard by the National Adjudicatory 
Council. See FINRA CODE OF PROCEDURE R. 9310-13. An aggrieved person may then 
appeal to the SEC, or the SEC may review the matter on its own motion. See Exchange Act § 
19(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(d) (2006); FINRA, CODE OF PROCEDURE R. 9370. A person aggrieved 
by an SEC final order may obtain review in the Circuit Court of Appeals in which he resides 
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FAA and the Exchange Act that is currently being litigated by motivated 
parties. 
While Schwab challenges in particular FINRA’s authority to bar the class 
action waiver provision, the dispute has broader implications. Round two of 
AT&T Mobility is likely to involve other conflicts between the FAA and federal 
regulatory policy designed to protect certain segments of the public.55 For 
example, in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(Dodd-Frank),56 Congress created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
(CFPB),57 with broad authority to administer, enforce and implement the 
provisions of federal consumer financial law.58 After completing a study on the 
use of PDAAs in connection with the offering or providing of consumer 
financial products or services,59 the CFPB may adopt rules to “prohibit or 
impose conditions or limitations” on the use of PDAAs if it finds that such a 
rule is “in the public interest and for the protection of consumers.”60 The CFPB 
has not yet completed the requisite study,61 but if it ultimately determines to 
move forward with rulemaking to limit or prohibit use of PDAAs in consumer 
financial services agreements, we can expect industry challenges that may 
ultimately come before the courts. 
Does the FAA limit the ability of federal regulators acting pursuant to 
congressional authority to impose conditions and limitations on the use of 
arbitration provisions in order to ensure fairness? In this Article, we focus on 
the federal securities laws and argue that, when in direct conflict, the Exchange 
Act’s specific and more recent regulations designed to protect investors 
supplant the FAA’s general (though powerful) mandate supporting the 
 
or has his principal place of business or to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. See 
Exchange Act § 25(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78y. FINRA, acting in its adjudicative capacity as a 
lower tribunal subject to SEC plenary review of its disciplinary decisions, is not an 
“aggrieved person.” NASD, Inc. v. SEC, 431 F.3d 803 (D.C. Cir. 2005). A court of appeals 
decision is then subject to review by the Supreme Court upon certiorari or certification. 28 
U.S.C. § 1254 (2006). 
 54.  While some have characterized the issue as one of “preemption,” we avoid that 
term here as it applies to conflicts between federal and state law, not conflicts between two 
federal laws. 
 55.  Paul F. Kirgis, The Roberts Court vs. the Regulators: Surveying Arbitration’s Next 
Battleground, 10 THE MAYHEW-HITE REPORT ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND THE COURTS, 
Issue 3, Mar. 2012, available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/epub/mayhew-hite/report/volume-
10/issue-3/. 
 56.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.). 
 57.  Id. §1011, 12 U.S.C. § 5491. 
 58.  Id. §1022(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5512. 
 59.  Id. §1028(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5518. 
 60.  Id. §1028(b), 12 U.S.C. §5518. 
 61.  Request for Information Regarding Scope, Methods and Data Sources for 
Conducting Study of Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements, 77 Fed. Reg. 25148 (Apr. 27, 
2012). 
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enforceability of arbitration agreements. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. In Part I, we summarize current 
Supreme Court FAA jurisprudence that establishes a strong national pro-
arbitration policy and discuss in detail the AT&T Mobility decision preempting 
a state judicial doctrine declaring class action waivers in an arbitration 
agreement unconscionable. In Part II, we describe the Exchange Act’s 
regulation of arbitration involving broker-dealers, including its anti-waiver 
provision barring any condition that forces investors to waive compliance with 
any part of the Act, its rules and SRO rules, and its authority delegated to the 
SEC and FINRA to regulate the content of arbitration clauses in broker-
dealer/customer contracts. Part III details the current litigation and regulatory 
dispute between Schwab and FINRA over Schwab’s inclusion of a class action 
waiver in its customer agreement. In Part IV, we demonstrate that Schwab’s 
conduct poses a clear conflict between the FAA and the Exchange Act. We 
argue that courts should resolve this conflict by applying the Exchange Act 
over the FAA through the long-standing doctrine of implied repeal, additional 
well-accepted canons of statutory construction, as well as current Exchange Act 
and FAA jurisprudence.  
I. THE FAA PREEMPTION DOCTRINE 
Congress enacted the FAA in 1925 “to overrule the judiciary’s long-
standing refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate.”62 Its primary substantive 
provision, § 2—which declares that agreements to arbitrate are “valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in 
equity for the revocation of any contract”63—“embodies the national policy 
favoring arbitration and places arbitration agreements on equal footing with all 
other contracts.”64 Thus, the FAA’s “principal purpose” was to “require[] 
courts to enforce privately negotiated agreements to arbitrate, like other 
contracts, in accordance with their terms.”65 
The Court has repeatedly held that the FAA “creates a body of federal 
substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement within 
the coverage of the Act.”66 In the past four decades, the Court’s FAA 
 
 62.  Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 
478 (1989); see also Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006). 
 63.  9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). This latter phrase of § 2 is known as the FAA’s “savings 
clause.” 
 64.  Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 443; see also Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury 
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (recognizing a “liberal federal policy favoring 
arbitration agreements”); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 
U.S. 614 (1985). 
 65.  Volt Info Scis., Inc., 489 U.S. at 478. 
 66.  See, e.g., Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24. The Court defined arbitrability in this 
context as “the duty to honor an agreement to arbitrate.” Id. at 25 n.32. 
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jurisprudence has catapulted the FAA to super-status: it governs virtually every 
arbitration clause arising out of a commercial transaction,67 applies in both 
state and federal court,68 compels the arbitrability of federal statutory claims,69 
permits arbitrators to rule on the unconscionability of the arbitration clause,70 
and preempts any state law that “actually conflicts with federal law—that is, to 
the extent that it ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of 
the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’”71 
Under FAA obstacle preemption, the Supreme Court has rebuffed state 
law-based defenses to the enforcement of arbitration agreements to the extent 
those defenses single out arbitration agreements for hostile treatment.72 Thus, 
the Court has held that the FAA preempts state statutes that prohibit the 
arbitration of a particular type of claim73 and state judicial rules that display 
 
 67.  By its terms, the FAA governs agreements to arbitrate involving “transactions in 
commerce.” 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). The Supreme Court has interpreted this phrase very 
broadly to include any transaction that in fact involves interstate commerce, even if the 
parties did not anticipate an interstate impact. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 
513 U.S. 265, 273-74, 281 (1995) (interpreting the reach of the FAA broadly to all 
transactions “involving commerce” and stating that “‘involving’ is broad and is indeed the 
functional equivalent of ‘affecting’”); Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 
(2002) (applying FAA to securities arbitrations); Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 
52 (2003) (applying FAA to debt restructuring agreements as “involving commerce”). 
 68.  See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984) (“The statements of the 
Court in Prima Paint that the Arbitration Act was an exercise of the Commerce Clause 
power clearly implied that the substantive rules of the Act were to apply in state as well as 
federal courts.”). 
 69.  CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012). 
 70.  Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010). 
 71.  Volt Info. Scis., Inc., 489 U.S. at 478 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 
67 (1941)); see Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967); Moses 
H. Cone, 460 U.S. 1; see also Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987) (preempting California 
statute requiring wage collection actions to be resolved in court). The Supreme Court has 
explained that it will find a state law preempted by a congressional act when: (1) the federal 
law expressly provides it displaces state law (express preemption); (2) Congress intends the 
federal law in an area to “occupy the field” (field preemption); (3) it is impossible for a party 
to comply with both the state and federal law (impossibility preemption); and (4) the 
challenged state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives of Congress (obstacle preemption). See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign 
Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372-73 (2000) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
Impossibility and obstacle preemption are both subcategories of conflict preemption. Id. See 
generally Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 228 (2000) (describing preemption 
categories). 
 72.  None of these decisions preempt a state arbitration law—laws that primarily 
address arbitration procedures and award enforcement, and almost uniformly further a pro-
arbitration policy. Rather, the Court has preempted state laws on non-arbitration matters that 
contain “lingering anti-arbitration sentiment.” Stephen L. Hayford & Alan R. Palmiter, 
Arbitration Federalism: A State Role in Commercial Arbitration, 54 FLA. L. REV. 175, 195 
(2002). 
 73.  See Southland, 465 U.S. at 12 (preempting provision of the California Franchise 
Investment Law that required judicial, not arbitral, resolution of claims brought under the 
statute); Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346 (2008) (preempting California law granting 
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vestiges of the ancient judicial hostility to arbitration.74 Similarly, the FAA 
preempts state statutes that invalidate arbitration agreements on grounds 
different than those that invalidate other contracts.75 For example, in 
Cassarotto, which arose out of a franchisor-franchisee dispute, the Court held 
that the FAA preempted a Montana statute requiring that, to be enforceable, an 
arbitration agreement must include very specific disclosures that it is subject to 
arbitration and in a very specific way (“typed in underlined capital letters on 
the first page of the contract”).76 Because this pro-consumer notice requirement 
applied only to arbitration agreements and not contracts generally, the Court 
concluded that the law singled out arbitration agreements for hostile treatment 
and was displaced by the FAA.77 
Most recently, in AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion,78 the Court held that 
the FAA preempted a state law that on its face was not anti-arbitration but was 
being applied by lower courts in a manner that de facto interfered with 
arbitration. In its consumer cellular phone service contracts, AT&T Mobility, 
LLC (AT&T) included a PDAA which, inter alia, prohibited plaintiffs from 
bringing class action arbitrations, instead requiring claims to be arbitrated on an 
individual basis. In 2006, the Concepcions sued AT&T in district court, 
alleging that AT&T’s practice of charging sales tax on a phone advertised as 
“free” was fraudulent.79 In December 2006, after the Concepcions filed their 
claim, AT&T revised the arbitration agreement to provide that AT&T would 
pay a customer $7,500 and twice its attorney’s fees if an arbitrator found in 
favor of a California customer on the merits of a customer dispute and awarded 
 
exclusive jurisdiction to Labor Commissioner to decide disputes arising under the Talent 
Agencies Act). 
 74.  See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 514 U.S. 52 (1995) (preempting 
New York law precluding arbitrators from awarding punitive damages); Buckeye Check 
Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006) (preempting Florida judicial rule that 
precluded arbitrators from deciding the legality of an allegedly usurious contract containing 
an arbitration agreement); Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012) 
(preempting West Virginia Supreme Court rule voiding as against public policy pre-dispute 
arbitration clauses in nursing home contracts with respect to negligence claims); Nitro-Lift 
Tech., L.L.C. v. Howard, 133 S. Ct. 500 (2012) (preempting Oklahoma Supreme Court rule 
that a court, not an arbitrator, determines the validity of a covenant not to compete in a 
contract containing an arbitration clause). In contrast, the FAA does not preempt a state 
arbitration statute that merely dictates the order of proceedings with respect to an arbitration 
and related third-party litigation, but does not regulate the viability or scope of the arbitration 
agreement itself. Volt Info. Scis., Inc., 489 U.S. 468. 
 75.  See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273-74, 281 (1995) 
(preempting Alabama statute invalidating pre-dispute arbitration agreements in consumer 
contracts); Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 685 (1996) (preempting 
Montana statute requiring specific type of notice in contract containing arbitration clause). 
 76.  Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 684 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(4) (1995)). 
 77.  Id. at 687. 
 78.  131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 79.  Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 853 (9th Cir. 2009). The 
Concepcions’ case was consolidated with Laster in September 2006. 
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more than the last AT&T settlement offer.80 Two years later, after the 
Concepcions’ case was consolidated with a putative class action alleging, inter 
alia, identical claims of false advertising and fraud, AT&T moved to compel 
arbitration under the revised agreement.81 
The district court refused to enforce the arbitration agreement in light of 
Discover Bank v. Superior Court.82 In Discover Bank, the California Supreme 
Court applied the state’s general unconscionability law83 to class-action 
waivers in arbitration agreements and held: 
[W]hen the waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting in 
which disputes between the contracting parties predictably involve small 
amounts of damages, and when it is alleged that the party with the superior 
bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers 
of consumers out of individually small sums of money, then . . . the waiver 
becomes in practice the exemption of the party “from responsibility for [its] 
own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another.” Under these 
circumstances, such waivers are unconscionable under California law and 
should not be enforced.84 
The district court in AT&T Mobility concluded that the class action waiver 
at issue was unconscionable because it had a deterrent effect on class actions 
and the efficient resolution of third-party claims.85 The Ninth Circuit affirmed 
and AT&T sought review in the Supreme Court.86 
In a 5-4 majority decision authored by Justice Scalia, the Court (joined by 
Justices Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas and Alito) held that the FAA preempts 
California’s Discover Bank interpretation of the state’s unconscionability rule, 
which, as the majority defined the rule, “classif[ied] most collective-arbitration 
waivers in consumer contracts as unconscionable.”87 Even though, as the 
dissent noted,88 the Discover Bank rule applied equally to class action waivers 
 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005). 
 83.  Under California law, a court may refuse to enforce a contract that it finds “‘to 
have been unconscionable at the time it was made,’” or it may “‘limit the application of any 
unconscionable clause.’” AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1746 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. 
§ 1670.5(a) (1985)). “A finding of unconscionability requires a ‘procedural’ and a 
‘substantive’ element, the former focusing on ‘oppression’ or ‘surprise’ due to unequal 
bargaining power, the latter on ‘overly harsh’ or ‘one-sided’ results.” Id. (citations omitted). 
 84.  113 P.3d at 1109-10. 
 85.  Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05CV1167 DMS (AJB), 2008 WL 5216255, at 
*14 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2008). 
 86.  Laster, 584 F.3d at 853-69. 
 87.  AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1746. 
 88.  In dissent, Justice Breyer (joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Kagan) 
argued that California’s Discover Bank rule “represents the ‘application of a more general 
[unconscionability] principle.’” Id. at 1757 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Gentry v. Superior 
Ct., 42 Cal. 4th 443, 457 (2007)). The dissent contended that, because the Discover Bank 
rule is a rule of state law applicable to all contracts and not just arbitration agreements, it 
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in all dispute resolution contracts, the majority was persuaded by research 
demonstrating that state courts had become more likely to find an arbitration 
agreement unconscionable as opposed to other contracts.89 Thus, the Discover 
Bank rule was preempted because “[r]equiring the availability of classwide 
arbitration interferes with fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus creates 
a scheme inconsistent with the FAA.”90 
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion reasoned that the Discover Bank rule 
interfered with arbitration because, while California’s “rule does not require 
class-wide arbitration, it allows any party to a consumer contract to demand it 
ex post,” thus defeating the purposes of the FAA.91 The Court discussed three 
characteristics of class arbitration that it concluded defeat the purposes of the 
FAA and hinder the flexible party-driven process of arbitration: (1) sacrifice of 
informality and speed; (2) a requisite increase in procedural formality; and (3) 
an increase in risks to defendants in the lack of judicial review.92 Exhibiting its 
distrust of class arbitration that also appeared in the Court’s 2010 decision in 
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp,93 the Court characterized class 
arbitration as not arbitration at all within the meaning of the FAA, but a process 
that alters the fundamental attributes of arbitration.94 
Criticizing the majority’s conclusion that class arbitration is lacking the 
“fundamental attribute[s]” of arbitration within the meaning of the FAA, the 
dissent argued that class proceedings are necessary to protect against small-
 
falls within the savings clause and the FAA should not preempt it. Id. 
 89.  AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1747. 
 90.  Id. at 1748. 
 91.  Id. at 1750. 
 92.  Id. at 1751-52. Although the majority expressly included the procedural 
expediency of arbitration as one of the FAA’s purposes with which the Discover Bank rule 
interferes, the dissent referred to the Court’s Dean Witter decision in which it specifically 
“reject[s] the suggestion that the overriding goal of the [FAA] was to promote the 
expeditious resolution of claims.” Id. at 1758 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Dean Witter 
Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985)). 
 93.  130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010) (arbitrators cannot construe silence in an arbitration 
agreement as consent to class arbitration). 
 94.  Justice Thomas “reluctantly join[ed]” the majority, but wrote “separately to 
explain how [he] would find [a] limit” on contract defenses permitted by FAA § 2. Id. at 
1753-54 (Thomas, J., concurring). In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas reasoned that 
the savings clause of the FAA permits exceptions to the enforceability of arbitration 
agreements only for defenses that “relate[] to the making of the [arbitration] agreement.” Id. 
at 1754-55 (quoting FAA § 4). Because the Discover Bank rule did not relate to the 
formation of the arbitration agreement within the meaning of FAA §§ 2 and 4, Justice 
Thomas concluded that it was preempted by the FAA. Justice Thomas may have felt 
compelled to articulate his reading of the savings clause because, in past preemption cases, 
he dissented based on his view, first articulated in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 
513 U.S. 265, 273-74, 281 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting), that the FAA does not apply in 
state courts. Since this case came up through the federal courts, that basis of dissent did not 
apply. 
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value claims falling through the cracks of the legal system.95 Justice Breyer 
opined that barring class arbitration and forcing lower courts to enforce 
adhesive class arbitration waivers would “have the effect of depriving 
claimants of their claims.”96 Justice Scalia responded to the dissent’s concern 
by stating that “States cannot require a procedure that is inconsistent with the 
FAA, even if it is desirable for unrelated reasons.”97 
Thus, under AT&T Mobility, the FAA preempts state laws that 
automatically void an arbitration agreement containing a class action waiver. 
AT&T Mobility does not, however, stand for the proposition that the FAA 
displaces federal laws that regulate certain types of arbitration agreements to, 
inter alia, ban class action waivers. In the next Part, we describe those 
provisions of the federal securities laws that regulate arbitration between 
customers and their brokerage firms. 
II. SEC AND FINRA REGULATION OF SECURITIES ARBITRATION PURSUANT TO 
THE EXCHANGE ACT 
In adopting the Exchange Act in 1934 and in subsequent amendments,98 
Congress recognized that securities transactions are “affected with a national 
public interest which makes it necessary to provide for regulation and control 
of [securities] transactions and of practices and matters related thereto.”99 “A 
basic factor underlying the enactment of the Federal securities acts was 
recognition of the intricate nature and high liquidity of securities and of the 
 
 95.  AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1760-61 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 96.  Id. at 1761. Justice Breyer asked the Concepcion majority, “[w]hat rational lawyer 
would have signed on to represent the Concepcions in litigation for the possibility of fees 
stemming from a $30.22 claim?” Id. at 1761 (citing Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 
F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) (“. . . [o]nly a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.”)). In doing so, 
he cited an appellate court which recognized previously the “realistic alternative to a class 
action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero individual suits . . . .” Id. at 1761. 
Academic commentary that followed the decision harshly criticized it as the death knell for 
consumers’ ability to pursue small dollar value claims. See, e.g., Sarah Cole, On Babies and 
Bathwater: The Arbitration Fairness Act and the Supreme Court’s Recent Arbitration 
Jurisprudence, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 457 (2011); Jean Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility v. 
Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 723 (2012). 
 97.  AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1753. 
 98.  In enacting the Exchange Act in 1934, Congress determined to rely, to a great 
extent, on industry self-regulation and designated national securities exchanges as SROs 
because they were already in existence as organizations that regulated their members. In 
1938, Congress amended the Exchange Act to authorize the registration of national securities 
associations to regulate brokers in the over-the-counter market. FINRA is the only registered 
national securities association. In 1975, Congress amended the Exchange Act to give the 
SEC broad new powers over the SROs, including the power to review all their proposed 
rules and to require them to adopt, change or repeal any rules. See generally NORMAN S. 
POSER & JAMES A. FANTO, BROKER-DEALER LAW AND REGULATION § 4 (4th ed. 2007). 
 99.  Exchange Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
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corresponding duties necessarily assumed by those who deal in them.”100 The 
broker-dealer industry is highly regulated “because of its economic 
importance” and “the possibility of investor abuse.”101 
The importance of investor protection and fairness is pervasive throughout 
the Exchange Act and in the regulation of broker-dealers. Three Exchange Act 
provisions give the SEC or FINRA authority to regulate PDAAs between 
customers and broker-dealers. Section 15A gives FINRA broad authority to 
regulate the broker-dealer industry, subject to SEC oversight. Two other 
provisions address agreements: § 29(a), which prohibits waivers of statutory or 
regulatory compliance, and § 15(o), which gives the SEC the power to ban 
PDAAs with respect to federal securities and SRO claims. We discuss below 
each of these provisions. 
A. Exchange Act § 15A 
Congress assigned the front-line authority for regulating the broker-dealer 
industry to SROs, including securities exchanges and national securities 
associations.102 Industry self-regulation is “an essential and officially 
sanctioned part of the regulatory pattern.”103 Indeed, “it is doubtful whether 
any regulated industry has been allowed to regulate itself to the degree the 
securities industry has.”104 FINRA is registered with the SEC as a national 
securities association under Exchange Act § 15A105 and is the largest 
independent regulator for all securities firms doing business in the United 
States.106 Congress also adopted a comprehensive system of SEC oversight 
over the SROs, in order that self-regulation could accomplish its purpose of 
protecting investors and serving the public interest.107 The SEC exercises 
oversight of FINRA’s activities, including operation of its arbitration forum,108 
the largest dispute resolution forum in the securities industry.109 
As a national securities association, FINRA’s raison d’etre is to carry out 
the statutory purposes and to enforce compliance by its members and 
associated persons with the provisions of the Exchange Act and its regulations 
 
 100.  U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES 
MARKETS, H.R. DOC. NO. 88-95, pt. 1, at 6 (1963) [hereinafter “SEC SPECIAL STUDY”]. 
 101.  POSER & FANTO, supra note 98, § 1.01. 
 102.  Exchange Act §§ 6, 15A, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f, 78o-3 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 103.  SEC SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 100, pt. 4, at 501. 
 104.  POSER & FANTO, supra note 98, § 4.01. 
 105.  Exchange Act § 15A, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3. 
 106.  About the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, FINANCIAL INDUSTRY 
REGULATORY AUTHORITY, http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/ (last visited Dec. 30, 2012). 
 107.  POSER & FANTO, supra note 98, § 4.04[A]. 
 108.  Exchange Act § 19, 15 U.S.C. § 78s (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 109.  Arbitration & Mediation, FINANCIAL INDUSTRY REGULATORY AUTHORITY, 
http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/index.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2012). 
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as well as FINRA’s own rules.110 The Exchange Act requires FINRA to adopt 
rules that may be designed for a variety of purposes, ranging from preventing 
“fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices” to promoting “just and 
equitable principles of trade” and “in general, [protecting] investors and the 
public interest.”111 FINRA must file proposed rule changes with the SEC, and 
the SEC must publish notice and provide interested persons an opportunity to 
comment on the proposal.112 With only minor exceptions, no proposed rule 
change takes effect unless it is approved by the SEC, upon a finding that it is 
“consistent” with the requirements of the Exchange Act and the applicable 
regulations.113 In addition, the SEC may, on its own initiative, amend FINRA’s 
rules as it deems “necessary or appropriate . . . in furtherance of the purposes of 
the Act,”114 thus giving the SEC further persuasive power to prod FINRA into 
action if necessary. 
We discuss in Part III.D the specific FINRA rules at issue in the dispute 
between FINRA and Schwab.115 These rules are the product of active 
engagement by both the SEC and FINRA in regulating the SRO securities 
arbitration process. At least since the mid-1970s the SEC has asserted the need 
for a nationwide investor dispute resolution system to handle small claims and 
has worked with the SROs, industry representatives and investor groups to 
develop arbitration rules to achieve this result.116 Indeed, in McMahon, the 
SEC filed an amicus brief in support of SRO arbitration.117 The SEC 
intensified its efforts after McMahon, when SRO arbitration became the 
principal forum for resolving customers’ disputes with their brokers.118 
 
 110.  Exchange Act § 15A(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 111.  Id. § 15A(b)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(6). The statute also lists certain improper 
purposes, including regulating “matters not related to the purposes of the Act. Id. 
 112.  Id. § 19(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(1). 
 113.  Id. § 19(b)(2)(C)(i), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(2)(C)(i). Conversely, the SEC must 
disapprove a proposed rule change if it does not make the requisite finding. Id. 
§19(b)(2)(C)(ii), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(2)(C)(ii). 
 114.  Id. § 19(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c). 
 115.  See infra notes 152-79 and accompanying text. 
 116.  Order Approving NYSE, NASD, and ASE Proposed Rule Changes relating to the 
Arbitration Process and the Use of Predispute Arbitration Clauses, 54 Fed. Reg. 21,144 
(May 16, 1989) [hereinafter 1989 Approval Order] (describing how the SROs have worked 
for the past twelve years to develop uniform arbitration rules through the Securities Industry 
Conference on Arbitration (SICA), which was formed at the SEC’s invitation to review 
arbitration procedures as alternatives to the SEC’s own proposals). 
 117.  Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners, Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (No. 86-44), 
1986 WL 727882. 
 118.  Gross, supra note 24, at 514 (describing how the SEC staff, after McMahon, 
recommended numerous rule changes to make arbitration fairer and more neutral). For a few 
years after McMahon, the SEC believed that some brokerage firms did not require customers 
opening cash accounts to sign PDAAs and thought that competitive forces might cause firms 
not to require PDAAs. See 1989 Approval Order, supra note 116. By 1996, a well-respected 
task force studying SRO arbitration reported that “most” individual investors have entered 
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FINRA, in turn, actively engages in ongoing reform of its arbitration rules “for 
the continual improvement of securities industry arbitration as a fair, 
expeditious, and economical means for the resolution of disputes.”119 From 
1997 to 2007, for example, FINRA’s predecessor, NASD, filed with the SEC 
more than sixty-five rule proposals on a variety of issues relating to 
arbitration.120 In its review of these proposed rule changes, the SEC 
consistently expressed its concerns about the fairness of the process. In the 
view of the SEC, fairness requires that investors have an understanding of the 
arbitration process and that arbitration should not unduly restrict rights and 
remedies that investors would have in court.121 In short, SEC oversight over 
SRO securities arbitration has been long-standing and robust.122 
B. Exchange Act § 29(a) 
Section 29(a) states that “any condition, stipulation, or provision binding 
any person to waive compliance” with any provision of the Exchange Act or its 
rules “shall be void.”123 Prior to Dodd-Frank, the statute also applied to rules 
issued by securities exchanges; Dodd-Frank amended § 29(a) to include rules 
issued by all SROs.124 Thus, for the first time, § 29(a) explicitly invalidates 
provisions in brokerage agreements that require customers to waive compliance 
with FINRA rules. 
Section 29(a) has been part of the Exchange Act since its original 
enactment. Its legislative history is scant,125 but this is not surprising. Congress 
 
into PDAAs. REPORT OF THE ARBITRATION POLICY TASK FORCE TO THE BOARD OF 
GOVERNORS NAT’L ASSOC. OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC. 3 (1996) [hereinafter RUDER 
REPORT]. By 2007, the Chairman of the Task Force noted that “almost all” individual 
investors sign PDAAs. See David S. Ruder, Foreword to NASD DISPUTE RESOLUTION, THE 
ARBITRATION POLICY TASK FORCE REPORT – A REPORT CARD 1, available at 
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@guide/documents/industry/p036466.p
df. 
 119.  NASD Notice to Members 89-21, Proposed Amendment Re: Predispute 
Arbitration Clauses in Customer Agreements (Mar. 1989), available at 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=1404. 
 120.  Gross, supra note 24, at 514. 
 121.  This history is described more fully in Black & Gross, supra note 24, at 998-1003. 
 122.  “Agency approval does not appear to be a sure thing.” Gross, supra note 24, at 
515; see also id. at 512-17 (discussing regulatory filings that reflect a dynamic rule-making 
process with considerable SEC involvement). 
 123.  15 U.S.C. § 78cc (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 124.  The same amendment is found in Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act §§ 927, 929T, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (Supp. V 2011) (Equal Treatment of Self-
Regulatory Organization Rules). 
 125.  Section 29(a) “was taken verbatim out of the Securities Act,” Stock Exchange 
Practices: Hearings on S. Res. 84, S. Res. 56 and S. Res. 97, Before S. Banking and 
Currency Comm., 73d Cong. 6578 (1934), reprinted in 6 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 (J. S. Ellenberger & 
Ellen Mahar eds., 2001). The legislative history of Section 14 of the Securities Act, 15 
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drafted the provision broadly and plainly and must have thought it required no 
explanation. The Supreme Court long ago identified the statute’s central 
purpose: “§ 29(a) is concerned . . . with whether the agreement ‘weakens 
[customers’] ability to recover under the Exchange Act.’”126 The investor 
protections afforded by the statute and its rules are so important that Congress 
would not permit parties to negotiate deals that weakened the statutory 
framework. While the congressional purpose may have been at least partly 
protective, reflecting a concern that the more sophisticated party might 
persuade the less sophisticated party to give up his rights, Congress also must 
have been concerned about the national interest and the importance of federal 
regulation for the overall fairness and effectiveness of the securities markets. 
Similarly, there is little discussion about the Dodd-Frank amendment; the need 
to “provide[] equal treatment for the rules of all SROs under Section 29(a)”127 
must have been self-evident. 
The Court has considered the interaction between § 29(a) and arbitration 
agreements. In McMahon, the Court held that, contrary to a thirty-year-old 
precedent,128 the anti-waiver provision did not render a PDAA unenforceable 
with respect to federal securities claims.129 Although the Court’s analysis 
focused initially on the statutory language and observed that what the statute 
prohibits are waivers of the statute’s “substantive obligations,”130 the Court 
went beyond this cramped reading. After examining the current state of 
securities arbitration, the Court concluded that, contrary to the Wilko court’s 
“mistrust of arbitration,”131 the process adequately vindicated the rights of 
individual customers, principally because of SEC oversight over the SRO 
arbitration forums.132 Thus, the Court expected that the SEC would assure that 
the process treated investors fairly and adequately protected their rights. The 
Court did not have occasion, either in McMahon or Rodriguez de Quijas, to 
consider the implications of § 29(a) on a PDAA with a class action or 
consolidated arbitration waiver.133 
 
U.S.C. § 77n, is silent as to the statute’s scope. See Margaret V. Sachs, The Relevance of 
Tort Law Doctrines to Rule 10b-5: Should Careless Plaintiffs Be Denied Recovery?, 71 
CORNELL L. REV. 96, 127 n. 237 (1985). 
 126.  Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 230 (1987) (quoting 
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953)). 
 127.  S. REP. NO. 111- 176, at 114 (2010). 
 128.  Wilko, 346 U.S. 427. The Court did not technically overrule Wilko until Rodriguez 
de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
 129.  482 U.S. 220 (1987). 
 130.  Id. at 228. 
 131.  Id. at 233. 
 132.  Id. at 238; Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 483. 
 133.  McMahon involved a husband and wife with both individual and pension/profit-
sharing plans; neither the district, appellate nor Supreme Court opinions mention the amount 
of damages they sought. Rodriguez involved two couples and two individuals who invested a 
total of $400,000. Thus, class treatment was not at issue and the damages claims apparently 
BLACKGROSS_VOL 1 1_PRINT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/1/13 3:57 PM 
Fall 2012] INVESTOR PROTECTION MEETS THE FAA 21 
In the 1990s, several circuit courts considered the applicability of § 29(a) 
to contracts for underwriting capital between Lloyd’s of London and U.S. 
residents.134 According to the plaintiffs, Lloyd’s solicited U.S. investors to 
raise capital and concealed the underwriting risks and massive liabilities 
relating to asbestos litigation. The contracts specified English choice of law and 
an English forum for investors’ claims, and Lloyd’s insisted that execution of 
the contracts take place on British soil. Although the plain meaning of § 29(a) 
prohibits a clause mandating application of English law, because such a clause 
is a “provision binding any person . . . to waive compliance with any provision 
of [the] Act,”135 the circuit courts uniformly upheld the choice of law clause on 
the ground that these were international transactions among sophisticated 
investors. Importantly, however, the courts recognized that the available 
English remedies must be “adequate substitutes” for federal securities laws.136 
Thus, while these opinions carve out a questionable exception for international 
securities contracts among sophisticated investors, they do not detract from the 
McMahon principle that § 29(a) forbids agreements that weaken investors’ 
protections under federal securities (or equivalent) laws. 
Lower courts have interpreted § 29(a) in the context of contracts other than 
arbitration agreements. These decisions have established that § 29(a) does not 
permit provisions that weaken investors’ ability to recover under the federal 
securities laws, no matter what form they take: “non-reliance” clauses in stock 
purchase agreements,137 “no-action” clauses in indentures,138 clauses that 
provide for an alternative remedy,139 or clauses that specify indemnification as 
the sole remedy.140 The only situation in which some courts have enforced non-
reliance clauses is negotiated contracts among sophisticated investors or 
corporate insiders where the written agreement contains specific 
representations and the non-reliance clause serves the purpose of barring 
 
were large enough to require no aggregation. 
 134. Bonny v. Soc’y of Lloyd’s, 3 F.3d 156 (7th Cir. 1993); Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd’s, 
996 F.2d 1353 (2d Cir. 1993); Lipcon v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 148 F.3d 1285 
(11th Cir. 1998) (recognizing it is a “close question,” but following the “weight of circuit 
authority”); Richards v. Lloyd’s of London, 135 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). 
 135.  See Richards, 135 F.3d at 1297-98 (Thomas, J. dissenting) (quoting § 14 of the 
Securities Act). 
 136.  Stamm v. Barclays Bank of New York, 153 F.3d 30, 33 (2d Cir. 1998); Richards, 
135 F.3d. at 1296. 
 137.  See, e.g., Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260 (1st Cir. 1966); Caiola v. Citibank, 
N.A., 295 F.3d 312 (2d Cir. 2002) (synthetic trading relationship); AES Corp. v. Dow Chem. 
Co., 325 F.3d 174 (3d Cir. 2003); MBI Acquisition Partners, L.P. v. Chronicle Publ’g. Co., 
No. 01-C-177-C, 2001 WL 1478812 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 6, 2001); Roll v. Singh, No. 07-CV-
04136 (FLW), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50125 (D.N.J. June 26, 2008). 
 138.  See, e.g., Kusner v. First Pa. Corp., 531 F.2d 1234 (3d Cir. 1976); McMahan & 
Co. v. Wherehouse Entm’t, Inc., 65 F.3d 1044 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 139.  See, e.g., Special Transp. Servs., Inc. v. Balto, 325 F. Supp. 1185 (D. Minn. 1971). 
 140.  Citibank, N.A. v. Itochu Int’l, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 6007 (GBD), 2003 WL 1797847 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2003). 
BLACKGROSS_VOL 1 1_PRINT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/1/13 3:57 PM 
22 STANFORD JOURNAL OF COMPLEX LITIGATION [Vol. 1:1 
representations not contained in the agreement.141 While the judiciary’s 
creation of a parol evidence rule exception to § 29(a) is questionable, it is of 
limited scope.142 
While we have not found any case law applying §29(a) to invalidate a 
provision that waived compliance with an exchange or SRO rule,143 under the 
statute’s plain meaning, as recently amended by Dodd-Frank, any contract 
provision in a brokerage agreement that purports to waive the firm’s 
compliance with any FINRA conduct or arbitration rule is void. Moreover, 
even if it is appropriate for courts not to apply the statute literally to provisions 
in contracts among sophisticated parties, this flexibility would not be relevant 
to a standard-form, adhesion agreement with retail investors. 
C. Exchange Act § 15(o) 
The third Exchange Act provision authorizing the SEC or FINRA to 
regulate broker-customer arbitration agreements stems from Dodd-Frank and is 
a response to the ongoing post-McMahon debate over the fairness of SRO 
securities arbitration.144 The Treasury Department’s 2009 white paper on 
financial reform expressed concern that PDAAs’ eliminating access to courts 
“may unjustifiably undermine investor interests.”145 It recommended an 
amendment to the federal securities laws to give the SEC clear authority to 
prohibit PDAAs in brokerage agreements with retail customers after further 
study of the issue.146 Indeed, Congress has expressed concern over the use of 
PDAAs in other contexts besides securities arbitration. In 2009, Congress 
considered, but did not pass, legislation to invalidate PDAAs in employment 
and consumer arbitration contracts and expressly included securities arbitration 
 
 141.  Harsco Corp. v. Segui, 91 F.3d 337 (2d Cir. 1996); Rissman v. Rissman, 213 F.3d 
381 (7th Cir. 2000) (no discussion of § 29(a)); see also Harborview Master Fund, L.P. v. 
Lightpath Tech., Inc., 601 F. Supp. 2d 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (ruling that “big boy” clause in 
contract between sophisticated parties did not violate § 29(a)). 
 142.  See Harsco, 91 F.3d at 343 (recognizing that plaintiff’s remedies were weakened, 
but emphasizing that this was a detailed written agreement negotiated among sophisticated 
parties). Harsco was distinguished in MBI Acquisition Partners, L.P., 2001 WL 1478812 
(distinguishing Harsco because plaintiffs alleged that they attempted to confirm truth of 
agreement’s representations, but were “duped” by false answers). 
 143.  The only reported case directly addressing this issue is Rospigliosi v. Clogher, 46 
So. 2d 170 (Fla. 1950), where the court held that a contract between a brokerage firm’s 
employee and his common-law wife to deal in stocks as partners was not invalid as 
constituting a waiver of the woman’s protection under a stock exchange rule that a member’s 
employee may not have an interest in a customer’s account. The decision is criticized in 10 
LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 4581 n.233 (3d ed. 2009). 
 144.  See Gross, supra note 16, at 1182-83, for additional background on the statute. 
 145.  DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, A NEW FOUNDATION: 
REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION 72 (2009), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport_web.pdf. 
 146.  Id. 
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within the definition of “consumer dispute.”147 
Dodd-Frank contains several provisions that reflect Congress’ concern with 
the use of PDAAs.148 Most importantly for this Article, in Dodd-Frank, 
Congress amended the Exchange Act to give the SEC explicit authority to 
prohibit, or to impose conditions or limitations on the use of, “agreements that 
require customers or clients . . . to arbitrate any future dispute between them 
arising under the Federal securities laws, the rules and regulations thereunder, 
or the rules of a self-regulatory organization if it finds that such prohibition, 
imposition of conditions, or limitations are in the public interest and for the 
protection of investors.”149 Section 15(o) of the Exchange Act is solely 
enabling and does not require the SEC to take any action. The language 
imposes a significant limitation on the SEC’s authority to prohibit the use of 
PDAAs: its authority does not extend to future disputes arising under state law. 
This limitation complicates the SEC’s analysis of the appropriate policy 
because, even if the SEC prohibited PDAAs to the full extent of its authority, 
firms presumably would still be free to require arbitration of state law claims. 
This would essentially return the industry to the pre-McMahon bifurcation of 
federal and state claims,150 a result that the SEC could reasonably view as 
undesirable.151 
Under § 15(o), the SEC has the broad authority to ban the use of PDAAs 
altogether with respect to federal securities class actions and SRO claims, so 
long as it found that it was in the public interest and for the protection of 
investors. Ipso facto, the SEC can ban the use of class action waivers, at least 
 
 147.  See Gross, supra note 16, at 1177-78 (noting that 2009 legislation to invalidate 
PDAAs expressly extended coverage to securities industry disputes through its definition of 
“consumer dispute,” but also noting that this legislation did not pass). 
 148.  One example is Dodd-Frank § 922(c)(2), which amended a provision originally 
adopted by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), Pub. L. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002), 
that created a private right of action for SOX whistleblowers, to prohibit enforcement of 
PDAAs as well as predispute waivers of retaliation rights and remedies with respect to 
claims arising under that section. See Dodd-Frank § 922(c)(2), adding 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(e) 
(Supp. V 2011) (Nonenforceability of Certain Provisions Waiving Rights and Remedies or 
Requiring Arbitration of Disputes). This provision reflects Congress’ judgment that investor 
protection measures can displace the FAA. See also supra notes 57-61 and accompanying 
text. 
 149.  15 U.S.C. § 78o(o) (emphasis added). The House Report supporting the bill 
indicates that Congress added this provision because it was concerned with “securities 
industry practices [that] have deprived investors of a choice when seeking dispute 
settlement, too. In particular, pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clauses inserted into 
contracts have limited the ability of defrauded investors to seek redress.” 156 CONG. REC. 
H5237 (daily ed. June 30, 2010) (statement of Rep. Paul Kanjorski). 
 150.  See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985) (holding that, when a 
complaint raises both federal securities law and pendent state law claims, district court must 
compel arbitration of state law claims and retain jurisdiction over federal statutory claims). 
 151.  See Barbara Black, How to Improve Retail Investor Protection after the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 59, 103-04 
(2010). 
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with respect to federal securities and SRO claims, so long as it makes the 
requisite findings. Congress, recognizing that there were grounds for concern 
about the use of PDAAs in customer agreements, authorized the SEC to protect 
investors from brokers’ overreaching, even if this conflicts with the policies 
and purposes of the FAA as interpreted by the Court. 
D. FINRA Rules at Issue in the Schwab Dispute 
We turn now to the pertinent SRO rules and regulations enacted pursuant 
to these Exchange Act provisions that are involved in the dispute between 
Schwab and FINRA. In this section, we detail FINRA’s reasons for proposing 
these rules and the SEC’s findings in approving the rules. 
1. Disclosures about the arbitration process; prohibiting inconsistent 
conditions (current FINRA Rule 2268)  
FINRA Rule 2268152 sets forth requirements for broker-dealers’ use of 
PDAAs for customer accounts. As more fully described below, this rule 
mandates disclosure of certain information about the arbitration process and 
prohibits certain conditions that are inconsistent with SRO arbitration. It also 
sets forth formatting requirements to make the required disclosures more 
visible and readable. Violation of the rule subjects member firms to disciplinary 
action153 and could lead courts to invalidate any infringing PDAA.154 
 
 152.  FINRA Rule 2268(d) (2011) (originally National Ass’n. of Securities Dealers, 
Inc., Rules of Fair Practice Art. III, § 21(f) (1989); then renumbered NASD Rule 3110(f) 
(1996)). 
 153.  See Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., Notice to Members 95-85 (Oct. 1995); Nat’l 
Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., Notice to Members 95-16 (Mar. 1995). 
 154.  See supra note 122 and accompanying text. Courts have invalidated securities 
firms’ arbitration clauses that do not comply with agency regulations. See, e.g., Felkner v. 
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 800 F.2d 1466, 1470 (9th Cir. 1986) (refusing to enforce broker-
dealer’s arbitration agreement with customer who was engaged in commodities trading 
because it violated CFTC rules regulating commodities’ brokers’ arbitration clauses in their 
customer agreements). Courts also have held that a broker-dealer’s violation of an SRO rule 
voids an arbitration clause in that brokerage firm’s customer agreement, if the arbitration 
agreement specifically incorporated by reference those SRO rules. See Nielsen v. Piper, 
Jaffray & Hopwood, Inc., 66 F.3d 145, 148-49 (7th Cir. 1995) (failure to comply with 
NASD rules regulating arbitration agreement renders pre-dispute arbitration clause invalid); 
Chor v. Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood, Inc., 862 P.2d 26, 29 (Mont. 1993) (same); Mueske v. 
Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood, Inc., 859 P.2d 444, 450 (Mont. 1993) (same). A few courts have 
concluded that, if an arbitration clause did not incorporate SRO rules, violation of those rules 
did not void the arbitration agreement. See J.C. Bradford & Co. v. Vick, 837 So. 2d 271, 275 
(Ala. 2002) (violation of NASD rule does not render PDAA in brokerage agreement void); 
Cantella & Co. v. Goodwin, 924 S.W.2d 943 (Tex. 1996) (same). See also Cariveau v. 
Halferty, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 417, 424-25 (Ct. App. 2000) (voiding settlement agreement under 
15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) as a matter of public policy because confidentiality clause violated 
NASD rules). 
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The precursor of FINRA Rule 2268—Article III, Section 21 of the 
NASD’s Rules of Fair Practice—was first adopted in 1989 as part of a package 
of uniform arbitration rules proposed in response to McMahon by a number of 
SROs that operated arbitration forums. The rule was designed to improve 
disclosure to customers in account opening statements and to restrict the 
content of PDAAs.155 Specifically: 
 The proposals would require broker-dealers that employ predispute 
arbitration clauses to place immediately before the clause introductory 
language that would inform customers that they are waiving their right to seek 
remedies in court, that arbitration is final, that discovery is generally more 
limited than in court proceedings, that the award is not required to contain 
factual findings and legal reasoning, and that the arbitration panel typically 
will include a minority of arbitrators associated with the securities industry. 
 The proposal requires that the disclosure language be highlighted in four 
ways. First, large or otherwise distinguishable type must be used. Second, the 
disclosure language must be set out in outline form so as to be noticeable to 
readers. Third, a statement, also highlighted, that provides that the agreement 
contains a predispute arbitration clause, and where that clause is located in the 
contract, must be inserted into the agreement immediately preceding the 
signature line. Fourth, a copy of the agreement containing a predispute 
agreement must be given to the customer, who is to acknowledge receipt of 
the agreement, either in the agreement itself or in a separate document. 
 The proposal also prohibits SRO members from having agreements with 
customers that limit or contradict the rules of any SRO or limit the ability of a 
party to file any claim in arbitration or limit the ability of the arbitrators to 
make any award.156 
In approving the rule, the SEC identified two principal benefits to 
investors. First, the disclosure provisions “address many of the concerns 
regarding customer notice and choice that have been considered over recent 
years” and the language “should promote more knowledgeable acquiescence or 
rejection by customers of arbitration provisions.”157 Second, the prohibition 
against inconsistent conditions was necessary because “agreements cannot be 
used to curtail any rights that a party may otherwise have had in a judicial 
forum.”158 Accordingly, the new rule “appropriately balance[s] the need to 
strengthen investor confidence in the arbitration systems at the SROs . . . with 
the need to maintain arbitration as a form of dispute resolution that provides for 
equitable and efficient administration of justice.”159 
By 1995, however, NASD became aware that some broker-dealers were 
using PDAAs containing provisions that were “inconsistent” with the NASD 
 
 155.  1989 Approval Order, supra note 116, at 21153. 
 156.  Id. 
 157.  Id. at 21154. At this time, the SEC believed that customers opening cash accounts 
could find a broker that did not require a PDAA. 
 158.  Id. 
 159.  Id. at 21155. 
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rule or that “subvert[ed] its purposes.”160 Firms were impermissibly attempting 
to dictate the location for the arbitration hearing, shorten the applicable statute 
of limitations, and limit the authority of arbitrators to award punitive damages, 
among other problems. NASD warned that the use of PDAAs that were 
inconsistent with its Rule 3110(f) may subject NASD members to disciplinary 
action. 
In 1998, NASD found it necessary to file with the SEC a proposed rule 
change to require additional disclosure in PDAAs about the arbitration process 
because “investor representatives have expressed concern that many customers 
who sign predispute arbitration agreements still do not understand adequately 
what they are agreeing to. Customers’ perceptions of unfairness are heightened 
by the fact that, in order to open an account, they are forced to agree to SRO-
sponsored arbitration.”161 NASD was principally focused on some firms’ use of 
choice-of-law clauses to select a state law that was favorable to the firm162 and 
the perceived unfairness to the customer, who would not understand the 
significance of the choice of law and its effect on investors’ claims. 
The rule, as ultimately approved by the SEC in 2004, required a fuller 
description of differences between arbitration and court proceedings. It retained 
the prohibition on broker-dealers inserting in their customers’ arbitration 
clauses “any condition that: (1) limits or contradicts the rules of any self-
regulatory organization; (2) limits the ability of a party to file any claim in 
arbitration; . . . [and] (4) limits the ability of arbitrators to make any award.”163 
Instead of mandating language that would regulate choice of law provisions (to 
which some claimants’ representatives objected), the rule added another 
category of prohibited provision: any that “(3) limits the ability of a party to file 
any claim in court permitted to be filed in court under the rules of the forums in 
which a claim may be filed under the agreement.”164 In its approval order, the 
SEC found that it should provide customers with “clearer and enhanced 
disclosure regarding the terms of predispute arbitration agreements” and that 
the new rule “incorporates important protections into the text of the arbitration 
agreement itself.”165 In addition, the new language prohibiting the use of 
 
 160.  Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., Notice to Members 95-16 (Mar. 1995). 
 161.  Order Granting Approval to Proposed Rule Change as Amended and Notice of 
Filing and Order Granting Accelerated Approval to Amendment No. 5 by the National 
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., Regarding NASD Rule 3110(f) Governing 
Predispute Arbitration Agreements with Customers, 69 Fed. Reg. 70293 (Dec. 3, 2004) 
[hereinafter 1994 Approval Order]. In 2011, the SEC approved FINRA Rule 2268, the 
successor to NASD Rule 3110(f), without any changes that are relevant to this Article. Order 
Approving a Proposed Rule Change Adopting FINRA Rules Regarding Books and Records 
in the Consolidated FINRA Rulebook, 76 Fed. Reg. 5850 (Jan. 27, 2011). 
 162.  E.g., state laws that limited punitive damages; state laws with short statutes of 
limitations. 
 163.  FINRA R. 2268(d)(1), (2) and (4) (2011). 
 164.  1994 Approval Order, supra note 161, at 70294. 
 165.  Id. at 70294. 
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restrictive conditions “achieve[d] an appropriate balance between the interests 
of investors and the ability of parties to agree contractually to fair terms that 
would govern their disputes.”166 In approving this new language, the SEC 
reiterated its view that broker-dealer PDAAs could not limit investors’ rights 
and remedies. 
2. Class action claims (current FINRA Rules 12204, 2268(f))  
Prior to 1992, NASD did not have a rule expressly dealing with class 
claims. Through the public comment process of the 1989 rule changes, one 
commenter suggested that the SROs should establish procedures for class 
actions.167 The SEC responded that SICA was considering a policy 
whereby all SROs will decline jurisdiction over class action litigation unless 
the class certification and representation issues have first been resolved by a 
court of competent jurisdiction. At that time, under the SROs’ existing rules, 
both the SROs and the arbitrators for a particular case may determine whether 
the facilities of the SRO are adequate to handle the litigation, or whether 
parties should be referred to their remedies at law.168 
NASD, however, never adopted such a policy. Instead, in 1992, NASD 
proposed a class action rule in response to the SEC’s concern that investors 
should have access to the courts in appropriate cases, including class actions.169 
While the rule’s language has been rewritten over the years, the substance of 
the rule has not changed.170 First, the NASD arbitration forum would not 
accept class action claims.171 Second, the forum would not permit arbitration of 
 
 166.  Id. at 70295-96. 
 167.  1989 Approval Order, supra note 116, at 21154. 
 168.  Id. at n.56. 
 169.  The SEC referred to this as a “suggestion” made by SEC Chairman David Ruder. 
See Proposed Rule Change by National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., Relating to 
Improvements in the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure, 57 Fed. Reg. 30519, 30520 (July 
9, 1992). NASD referred to this as the SEC’s “directive.” See National Ass’n of Securities 
Dealers, Inc., Notice To Members 92-65 (Dec. 1992), available at 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=1660. 
 170.  The 2007 revision to reorganize and rewrite the Code provisions in plain English 
did not make any substantive changes from NASD Rule 10301 to FINRA Customer Code 
Rule 12204. See Order Approving Proposed Rule Change and Amendments 1, 2, 3, and 4 To 
Amend NASD Arbitration Rules for Customer Disputes and Notice of Filing and Order 
Granting Accelerated Approval of Amendments 5, 6, and 7 Thereto; Order Approving 
Proposed Rule Change and Amendments 1, 2, 3, and 4 To Amend NASD Arbitration Rules 
for Industry Disputes and Notice of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated Approval of 
Amendments 5, 6, and 7 Thereto, 72 Fed. Reg. 4574-01, 4580 (Jan. 31, 2007) [hereinafter 
2007 Approval Order]. 
 171.  The SEC recently approved another FINRA proposed rule change to clarify that 
collective actions brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act cannot be arbitrated in the 
FINRA forum, in response to a judicial decision interpreting FINRA Customer Code Rule 
12204 to the contrary. See Notice of Filing of Amendment No. 1 and Order Granting 
Accelerated Approval of a Proposed Rule Change, as Modified by Amendment No. 1, 
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individual claims based on the same facts and law and involving the same 
defendants as in a class-certified or putative class action unless the claimant 
established that he was not participating in the class action. Third, the broker 
may not enforce any arbitration agreement against a member of a certified or 
putative class action until the class action was denied certification or the 
member was excluded or withdrew from the class.172 Finally, FINRA amended 
the rule governing the content of PDAAs to require a statement prohibiting 
persons from bringing class actions in arbitration and from attempting to 
enforce an arbitration agreement against a member of a class action.173 
In proposing the bar on class actions in the arbitration forum, NASD made 
clear its view that investors should have the opportunity to pursue class claims 
in appropriate cases. It determined that courts were the preferable forum for 
class claims, because they already had in place procedures to manage class 
claims. Moreover, firms should not be able to defeat class actions by enforcing 
an arbitration agreement against class members. Thus, the NASD rule 
recognized that class actions were important for investor protection and 
reflected an efficient allocation of resources between two dispute resolution 
systems. Accordingly, the proposed rule provided that class actions and claims 
of individual class members would not be eligible for arbitration at NASD, 
regardless of any PDAA.174 
In approving the rule, the SEC expressed its agreement with NASD’s 
position that investors should have access to courts to pursue class action 
claims: 
in all cases, class actions are better handled by the courts and that investors 
should have access to courts to resolve class actions efficiently. In the past, 
individuals who attempted to certify class actions in litigation were subject to 
enforcement of their separate arbitration contracts by their broker-dealers. 
Without access to class actions in [appropriate] cases, both investors and 
broker-dealers have been put to the expense of wasteful, duplicative 
litigation. . . .  
. . . The Commission believes that investor access to the courts should be 
preserved for class actions. . . .175 
 
Amending Rule 13024 of the Code of Arbitration Procedure for Industry Disputes To 
Preclude Collective Action Claims From Being Arbitrated, 77 Fed. Reg. 22374 (Apr. 9, 
2012). This approval order reiterated two principles: collective actions belong in courts, and 
access to courts for class or collective action litigation should be preserved. 
 172.  FINRA CUSTOMER CODE R. 12204 (2008) (originally NASD Rules of Fair 
Practice Art. III § 12(d) (1992), then renumbered NASD Rule 10301 (1996)). 
 173.  FINRA R. 2268(f) (2011) (originally NASD Rules of Fair Practice Art. III, § 21(f) 
(1992), then NASD Rule 3110(f) (1996)). 
 174.  Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Exclusion of Class 
Actions from Arbitration Proceedings, 57 Fed. Reg. 52659, 52660 (Nov. 4, 1992). 
 175.  Id. at 52661. 
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3. Joinder of claims (current FINRA Rules 12312, 12313, 12314) 
Investors may benefit by combining similar claims to achieve efficiencies 
and cost-savings. FINRA permits joinder of claims in certain circumstances.176 
Claimants may join multiple claims in the same arbitration if (1) the claims 
contain common questions of law or fact, and (2) the claims assert any right to 
relief jointly and severally, or the claims arise out of the same transaction or 
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences. The Director of Arbitration 
has the discretion to consolidate or sever claims; his discretion is preliminary 
and may be reconsidered by the panel.177 NASD’s pre-McMahon arbitration 
rules contained a provision permitting joinder of similar claims;178 the 
substance of the provisions has not changed during the subsequent revisions of 
the arbitration rules and has engendered little discussion.179 
In the next Part, we narrow in on the conflict between Schwab and FINRA 
with respect to the class and consolidated action waiver in the Schwab 
customer agreement. 
III. THE SCHWAB-FINRA SHOWDOWN 
In October 2011, FINRA member Schwab amended its customer 
agreement to force customers to agree not to bring or participate in class 
actions or class arbitrations against Schwab.180 In addition, the amended 
agreement requires customers to agree that arbitrators have no authority to 
consolidate more than one party’s claims. Instead, customers must bring their 
claims “solely in individual capacities.”181 
In response, in early 2012, FINRA Enforcement filed a disciplinary action 
against Schwab, challenging Schwab’s actions as a violation of several 
provisions of FINRA’s rules.182 Specifically, Schwab’s new PDAA language 
 
 176.  FINRA CUSTOMER CODE R. 12312 (2008), 12313 (2008), 12314 (2011). 
 177.  FINRA CUSTOMER CODE R. 12312 (2008). 
 178.  Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., Code of Arbitration Procedure, § 25(c). The 
NASD Code in effect in July 1987 is republished as Exhibit 24 of SECURITIES ARBITRATION 
1988, at 399 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series No. 601, 1988). 
Clarifying changes to the language were made in 1991. Order Granting Approval to 
Proposed Rule Change Relating to Improvements in the NASD Code of Arbitration 
Procedure, 56 Fed. Reg. 22029-02 (May 13, 1991). 
 179.  The predecessor of the current rules was NASD Rule 10314(d). The 2007 revision 
of the Code did not change its substance. 2007 Approval Order, supra note 170. 
 180.  Complaint For Declaratory and Preliminary and Permanent Injunctive Relief ¶ 26, 
Charles Schwab & Co. v. Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., Inc., 861 F. Supp. 2d 1063 (N.D. 
Cal. 2012) (No. CV 12-0518) (alleging that Schwab inserted a new clause entitled “Waiver 
of Class Action or Representative Action” in its Customer Account Agreements). 
 181.  Id. 
 182.  Complaint and Request for Expedited Hearing, Dept. of Enforcement v. Charles 
Schwab & Co., FINRA Disciplinary Proceeding No. 2011029760201 (Feb. 1, 2012), 
available at http://disciplinaryactions.finra.org/viewdocument.aspx?DocNB=29288. 
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violates FINRA Rule 2268(d)(1)183 and 2268(d)(3)184 (and its predecessor 
rule), which in turn is a violation of FINRA Rule 2010, requiring a member, “in 
the conduct of its business, [to] observe high standards of commercial honor 
and just and equitable principles of trade.”185 FINRA argues that, because Rule 
12204(d) of the FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes 
addresses the manner in which customers can bring and participate in class 
actions against member firms,186 the forum rules clearly permit class actions in 
court, and Schwab’s class action waiver contradicts Rule 12204.187 In addition, 
although the Schwab agreement contains the disclosures mandated by Rule 
2268, the class action waiver and prohibition on joinder flatly contradict the 
required disclosures.188 FINRA seeks an order that Schwab cease from further 
violating Rule 2268 as well as sanctions. 
To attempt to moot the FINRA enforcement action, Schwab 
simultaneously filed an action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of California189 seeking a declaratory judgment that FINRA “may not 
enforce its rules regulating broker-dealers in a manner inconsistent with the 
Federal Arbitration Act as most recently interpreted by [the Court’s decisions 
in AT&T Mobility and CompuCredit].”190 In its complaint, Schwab argued that 
the FAA bars FINRA from proceeding with its disciplinary action and “the 
FAA requires enforcement of class action waivers absent a Congressional 
command to the contrary.”191 Although Schwab acknowledged that FINRA’s 
rules have the “force of federal law” as they are derived from the Exchange 
Act,192 Schwab neither acknowledged nor addressed the argument that the 
FAA yields to the Exchange Act. 
On February 21, 2012, Schwab filed a motion for preliminary injunction in 
its declaratory judgment action, reasserting its arguments. On February 22, 
FINRA in turn filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
 
 183.  See supra notes 152, 163 and accompanying text. 
 184.  See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
 185.  FINRA R. 2010 (Standards of Commercial Honor and Principles of Trade), 
available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&record_id=6905 
&element_id=5504&highlight=2010#r6905. 
 186.  Likewise, Rule 13204 of the Code of Arbitration Procedure for Industry Disputes 
precludes arbitration of intra-industry class action disputes. See Gomez v. Brill Secs., Inc., 
943 N.Y.S.2d 400 (App. Div. 2012) (refusing to compel arbitration of, inter alia, labor law 
claims by brokerage firm employees that were subject of putative class action). 
 187.  FINRA Complaint, supra note 182, at ¶¶ 17-20. 
 188.  Id. ¶¶ 23-26; 29-32. 
 189.  Complaint For Declaratory and Preliminary and Permanent Injunctive Relief, 
Charles Schwab & Co. v. Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., Inc., 861 F. Supp. 2d 1063 (N.D. 
Cal. 2012) (No. CV 12-0518). Schwab offered to pay its customers’ arbitration filing fees 
pending the outcome of its suit. 
 190.  Id. at 2. 
 191.  Id. at ¶ 32. 
 192.  Id. at ¶ 33. 
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Noting that Schwab instituted this judicial proceeding within hours after the 
disciplinary complaint was served, FINRA argued that Schwab failed to meet 
the prerequisite for filing a federal lawsuit—exhaustion of its administrative 
remedies.193 
On May 11, 2012, the federal district court in California granted FINRA’s 
motion to dismiss Schwab’s complaint on the ground that Schwab failed to 
exhaust its administrative remedies and thus the court lacked jurisdiction to 
hear the complaint.194 Notably, the court stated that the interpretation of 
FINRA’s Rule 2268, which FINRA argued prohibits brokerage firms from 
including a class action waiver in their arbitration clauses, is an issue “squarely 
within the expertise of FINRA, as well as the SEC.” Schwab announced soon 
after the district court’s decision that it would not enforce the class action 
waiver in its customer agreements until the FINRA disciplinary action is final, 
and the time to appeal from that decision has lapsed.195 
Schwab’s brazen challenge to FINRA’s authority to proscribe language in 
its customer arbitration clauses raises, on its merits, an issue no court appears to 
have addressed: does the FAA’s mandate to treat arbitration agreements the 
same as other contracts and to enforce them according to their terms yield in 
the face of the conflicting policy of the Exchange Act to assure fairness and to 
protect investors? 
IV. RECONCILING THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE FAA AND THE EXCHANGE ACT 
As described above, the Schwab controversy poses a direct conflict 
between the policies of the FAA and the Exchange Act.196 Which statute 
governs? On the one hand, in Casarotto, the Court held that the FAA displaces 
a state law that imposes specific disclosure requirements on arbitration 
agreements.197 In AT&T Mobility, the Court upheld a class action waiver 
because states cannot restrict the terms in an arbitration agreement even if 
“desirable for unrelated reasons.”198 On the other hand, the Court has declared 
repeatedly that the FAA’s mandate is not absolute: it “may be overridden by a 
contrary Congressional command.”199 
 
 193.  Id. Schwab did not assert valid reasons for bypassing the disciplinary 
proceeding—either that the disciplinary proceeding would be too time-consuming or that the 
FINRA and SEC adjudicators lack the expertise to address issues outside of securities law or 
FINRA rules. 
 194.  See Charles Schwab & Co., 861 F. Supp. 2d 1063. 
 195.  Schwab To Hold Off Enforcing Class Action Waivers, WESTLAW J. CLASS ACTION, 
June 21, 2012, at 1 (reporting that Schwab spokesperson announced the company “‘does not 
have plans to enforce the waiver until the FINRA matter is resolved’”). 
 196.  See supra notes 178-93 and accompanying text. 
 197.  Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Cararotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996). 
 198.  AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011). 
 199. Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226-27 (1987); CompuCredit 
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The Exchange Act gives the SEC and FINRA broad authority to regulate 
the broker-dealer industry in order to protect investors. FINRA regulations 
promulgated pursuant to the Exchange Act—which have the force of federal 
law—impose specific disclosure requirements on arbitration agreements, forbid 
class action waivers and permit joinder of claims, in order to make the 
arbitration process fairer. As described more fully below, under accepted 
canons of statutory construction, including the implied repeal doctrine, as well 
as under Exchange Act and FAA jurisprudence, FINRA’s regulations of 
arbitration clauses in brokerage firms’ customer agreements should prevail in 
the face of a challenge under the FAA because, consistent with the policies 
underlying the Exchange Act, they were adopted to assure fair treatment and 
protect investors. 
A. The FAA is Impliedly Repealed by the Exchange Act 
1. The traditional doctrine of implied repeal 
When inconsistent laws emanate from a single legislature, absent an 
express exemption clause in either, the Supreme Court reconciles them by 
applying the long-standing canon of statutory construction known as the 
implied repeal doctrine. Long disfavored and limited to narrow 
circumstances,200 the doctrine applies only when necessary to make a later 
enactment work,201 and even then applies only to the extent necessary to 
reconcile the conflicting laws.202 The burden is on the party seeking the 
implied repeal to show congressional intent to override the former law, which 
can be proven through (1) the text of the law, (2) its legislative history, or (3) 
an inherent conflict between the edict of the former law and the underlying 
purpose of the latter.203 “Although not explicitly stated in the case law, it is 
self-evident that the ‘inherent conflict’ test requires a balancing of the 
 
Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 669 (2012). 
 200.  See, e.g., United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939); United States v. 
Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 734 (1975) (implied repeal limited to “particular 
and discrete instances” where an appeal was “necessary to make the [regulatory scheme] 
work”) (alteration in original) (quoting Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 
(1963)). 
 201.  “Where there are two acts upon the same subject, effect should be given to both if 
possible.” Posadas v. Nat’l City Bank of N.Y., 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936). 
 202.  See Silver, 373 U.S. at 357; Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 273 (2003);. For a 
detailed discussion of the traditional doctrine, see Jesse W. Markham, Jr., The Supreme 
Court’s New Implied Repeal Doctrine: Expanding Judicial Power To Rewrite Legislation 
Under the Ballooning Conception of “Plain Repugnancy,” 45 GONZ. L. REV. 437, 454-55 
(2009) (citations omitted); Karen Petroski, Retheorizing the Presumption Against Implied 
Repeals, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 487 (2004). 
 203.  McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226-27. 
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legislative interests in play in a particular case.”204 
Under the traditional test for implied repeal, if the latter law is “plainly 
repugnant” to the former so that they cannot be read as a single law, then the 
latter enactment “impliedly repeals” the former.205 However, “[i]mplied repeal 
does not automatically result from the mere existence of a newer statute on the 
same subject; such a construction of the doctrine would mean the legislature 
could never enact complementary, remedial, or cumulative laws in the same 
area.”206 
Professor Markham eloquently described the doctrine: 
One of the oldest canons of statutory interpretation is the implied repeal 
doctrine, whose earliest articulation is found in Lord Coke’s 1614 decision in 
Dr. Foster’s Case. In its traditional formulation, implied repeal has been 
understood to be a very narrow doctrine that reconciles older and newer 
enactments by minimally paring back older law where there is no plausible 
understanding of the laws that can avoid the inconsistency. Courts apply this 
doctrine rarely because it is limited to reconciling laws that are so ‘plainly 
repugnant’ to one another that they are incapable of coexisting. Even when 
faced with plainly incompatible enactments, the doctrine allows for only the 
most modest displacement of the earlier law.207 
The Supreme Court has applied the traditional test to displace federal 
antitrust laws in favor of conflicting securities laws. In Gordon v. New York 
Stock Exchange,208 a group of investors challenged as anticompetitive the New 
York Stock Exchange’s and American Stock Exchange’s rules that fixed 
commission rates.209 In light of text in the Exchange Act210 specifically 
authorizing the SEC to fix reasonable rates of commission along with 
legislative history of recent amendments,211 the Court found that an implied 
repeal of the Sherman Act was necessary to fulfill the intent of Congress.212 
Likewise, in United States v. National Association of Securities Dealers,213 the 
United States challenged SEC regulations, NASD rules and agreements among 
 
 204.  AmeriCorp, Inc. v. Hamm, 2:11-CV-677-MEF, 2012 WL 1392927, at *3 (M.D. 
Ala. Apr. 23, 2012) 
 205.  Posadas, 296 U.S. at 503-04. 
 206.  Markham, Jr., supra note 202, at 455. 
 207.  Id. at 439 (citations omitted). 
 208.  422 U.S. 659 (1975). 
 209.  Id. at 660-61. 
 210.  Exchange Act § 19(b)(9), 15 U.S.C. § 78s (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 211.  Gordon, 422 U.S. at 665-67. In a confusing factual twist, the relevant 
amendments, which did not take effect until after the case was heard before the Supreme 
Court, banned the very practice challenged as anticompetitive. Id. at 690. While this 
indicates Congress’ intent was in fact compatible with the plaintiffs’ interpretation of 
antitrust laws on the subject matter of commission rate fixing, the Court focused on the 
continued grant of regulatory and oversight power to the SEC, which would allow the SEC 
to set fixed commission rates in the future. Id. at 665-67. 
 212.  Id. at 691. 
 213.  422 U.S. 694 (1975). 
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mutual fund companies that restricted the transferability of mutual fund shares 
on the secondary market for a price other than the initial public offering.214 The 
relevant portions of the Investment Company Act permitted funds to make their 
own transferability restrictions so long as the SEC did not affirmatively 
disapprove of the provision.215 Again finding that the SEC was actively 
engaged in oversight—even if not acting in the specific instances in question—
the Court held that the Sherman Act was impliedly repealed by the subsequent 
grant of authority to the SEC.216 
2. The Credit Suisse formulation of implied repeal 
The Court employed the “plain repugnancy” test for over a century, only 
very recently loosening its stringency.217 Thus, in Credit Suisse Securities 
(USA) LLC v. Billing,218 the Court refined the “plain repugnancy” test by 
adding four factors for courts to consider when choosing between conflicting 
federal laws. Credit Suisse stemmed from a class action against multiple 
investment banks, which formed underwriting syndicates for the initial public 
offerings (IPO) of technology companies. Plaintiffs alleged violations of the 
federal antitrust laws through the underwriters’ various IPO sales practices, 
including laddering and tying, that artificially inflated stock prices and resulted 
in excessive commissions to investors.219 The underwriters moved to dismiss 
the antitrust complaints “on the ground that federal securities laws [including 
SEC regulations and NASD Conduct Rules] impliedly precludes application of 
antitrust laws to the conduct in question.”220 After the district court dismissed 
the complaints and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari. 
The Court first looked to its precedent that specifically addressed conflicts 
between securities law and antitrust law.221 After surveying that authority, the 
Court articulated four factors relevant to determining whether “there is a ‘clear 
repugnancy’ between the securities law and the antitrust complaint—or as we 
shall subsequently describe the matter, whether the two are “‘clearly 
incompatible’”: 
(1) The existence of regulatory authority under the securities law to supervise 
the activities in question; (2) evidence that the responsible regulatory entities 
exercise that authority; . . . (3) a resulting risk that the securities and antitrust 
 
 214.  Id. at 700-02. 
 215.  Id. at 726. 
 216.  Id. at 734-35. 
 217.  Markham, Jr., supra note 202, at 439 (stating that the traditional “narrow 
formulation of implied repeal has had a long and steady history—until now”). 
 218.  551 U.S. 264 (2007). 
 219.  Id. at 267-70. 
 220.  Id. at 270. 
 221.  Id. at 271-75. 
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laws, if both applicable, would produce conflicting guidance, requirements, 
duties, privileges, or standards of conduct [and] (4) the possible conflict 
affect[s] practices that lie squarely within an area of financial market activity 
that the securities law seeks to regulate.222 
Applying this four-factor test, the Court readily concluded that the SEC 
was authorized to and in fact had on several occasions regulated the 
underwriting process, a process important to financial market activities 
regulated by securities laws.223 The Court also decided that the complexity of 
the SEC regulations and the fact that the same evidence would be used to prove 
causes of action under both laws made it possible that courts could generate 
conflicting opinions in mixed antitrust-securities suits about acceptable 
underwriting practices, thus creating a conflict.224 The Court thus found clear 
incompatibility between these potential inconsistencies, even though the 
specific practices at issue had been clearly condemned by the SEC.225 
3. Precedent for implied repeal of the FAA 
The Court once considered an alleged conflict between the FAA and the 
Exchange Act under the traditional test for implied repeal. In McMahon, 
investors argued that Exchange Act § 29(a) (the anti-waiver provision) barred 
the arbitrability of claims arising under the Act, but the broker-dealer argued 
that the FAA mandated enforcement of the arbitration agreement for the 
statutory claims. The Court analyzed the conflict as an “implied repeal” 
question and announced that “the burden is on the party opposing 
arbitration . . . to show that Congress intended to preclude a waiver of judicial 
remedies for the statutory rights at issue,” and that such intent would be 
“‘deducible from [the statute’s] text or legislative history,’ or from an inherent 
conflict between arbitration and the statute’s underlying purpose.”226 
Ultimately, the Court found that Congress did not intend to require a judicial 
forum for the resolution of individual Exchange Act claims, and that arbitration 
conducted pursuant to procedures approved by the Commission does not 
weaken investors’ ability to recover under the Act.227 Because the McMahons’ 
 
 222.  Id. at 275-76. 
 223.  Id. at 276-77. 
 224.  Id. at 279-80. 
 225.  Id. at 279. Since Credit Suisse, several lower federal courts have found that the 
federal securities laws impliedly repeal the antitrust laws in other contexts. See, e.g., Elec. 
Trading Grp., LLC v. Banc of Am. Sec. LLC, 588 F.3d 128, 134-38 (2d Cir. 2009) (prime 
brokerage business with short sellers); Mayor of Baltimore v. Citigroup, Inc., Nos. 08 Cv. 
7746 (BSJ), 08 Cv. 7747 (BSJ), 2010 WL 430771 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2010) (investigation 
and regulation of auction-rate securities). 
 226.  Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226-27 (1987) (citing 
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628, 632-37 
(1985)). 
 227.  Id. at 227-38. 
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arbitration agreement with Shearson did not interfere with their rights protected 
by the Exchange Act, the Exchange Act did not conflict with the FAA, and 
both statutes could coexist. 
In contrast, lower federal courts have found implied repeal of the FAA in 
the face of other conflicting federal statutes. For example, several circuits have 
declined to enforce an otherwise valid arbitration agreement in core bankruptcy 
proceedings because it would conflict with the underlying purposes of the 
federal Bankruptcy Code.228 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit found that the 
Carmack Amendment, which was originally enacted before the FAA in 1906, 
and which regulates contract claims for interstate shipping and disallows 
arbitration agreements, displaced the FAA.229 Because the relevant portions of 
the statute creating a conflict had been added by amendment after enactment of 
the FAA, the court found that the FAA was impliedly repealed.230 
In addition, administrative agencies have ruled that the FAA yields to their 
interpretation that claims arising under statutes they are mandated to enforce 
are not arbitrable. For example, the Federal Trade Commission has concluded 
that claims arising under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act are not 
arbitrable.231 The National Labor Relations Board recently held that federal 
labor law, which emphasizes the right of employees to join in collective action 
and provides a substantive right to engage in “concerted activity,” bars 
collective and class action waivers in labor and employment contracts, even in 
an arbitration agreement.232 
The foregoing authorities demonstrate that it would not be unprecedented 
for a federal court or the SEC, upon review of a FINRA disciplinary action, to 
reason that the FAA is impliedly repealed by the Exchange Act for purposes of 
invalidating a class action waiver in a broker-dealer’s PDAA. In the next 
section, we establish that the Supreme Court’s current test for implied repeal 
 
 228.  See In re Nat’l Gypsum, 118 F.3d 1056, 1067-68 (5th Cir. 1997); In re U.S. Lines, 
197 F.3d 631, 640 (2d Cir. 1999); In re White Mountain Mining Co., 403 F.3d 164, 169 (4th 
Cir. 2005); In re Thorpe Insulation Co., 671 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 229.  Smallwood v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 660 F.3d 1115, 1120-21 (9th Cir. 2011) (tort 
and contract claims against a shipping company not arbitrable). 
 230.  Id. at 1124-25. 
 231.  Final Action Concerning Review of Interpretations of Magnuson-Moss Warranty 
Act, 64 Fed. Reg. 19700-01 (Apr. 22, 1999) (reaffirming Rule 703 it promulgated in 1975 
interpreting MMWA to preclude PDAAs in warranty agreements). But see Kolev v. 
Euromotors/The Auto Gallery, 676 F.3d 867 (9th Cir. 2012) (withdrawing earlier opinion 
that held that buyer’s Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act claims were not subject to arbitration). 
 232.  See D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184 at 9 (2012) (citing National Labor 
Relations Act § 7, which provides employees’ right to engage in “concerted activities” for 
“mutual aid or protection”). The NLRB based its holding on both an implied repeal analysis 
and a public policy defense to contract enforcement as permitted by the FAA’s savings 
clause. The company’s appeal is pending in the Fifth Circuit, and federal district courts are 
divided on the issue. See, e.g., Delock v. Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, Inc., 2012 WL 3150391 
(E.D. Ark. Aug. 1, 2012) (rejecting NLRB’s position because of CompuCredit and certifying 
issue for interlocutory appeal). 
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requires the invalidation of Schwab’s class action waiver. 
4. The Exchange Act and FINRA Rules displace the FAA 
Under the “plain repugnancy” standard as refined by the four Credit Suisse 
factors, FINRA rules governing the arbitration process and a broker-
dealer/customer PDAA, promulgated with SEC approval, impliedly repeal the 
FAA to the extent they are in conflict. First, as discussed supra,233 three 
provisions of the Exchange Act empower the SEC (either directly or through its 
oversight of FINRA) to regulate the arbitration process and PDAAs in 
customer agreements: § 15A, § 29(a), and, most recently and pertinently, § 
15(o). In § 15(o), Congress gave the SEC the express power to prohibit, or to 
impose conditions or limitations on a broker-dealer’s use of a customer PDAA 
“if it finds that such prohibition, imposition of conditions, or limitations are in 
the public interest and for the protection of investors.”234 Thus, the SEC has the 
express authority to ban PDAAs altogether in customer agreements, as well as 
the power to impose any condition or limitation on that PDAA, which surely 
includes an anti-investor provision such as a class action waiver.235 
Second, the SEC has regularly and consistently exercised this authority at 
least since McMahon,236 through its general oversight of the FINRA arbitration 
forum237 and, specifically, through its review and approval of FINRA Conduct 
Rules as well as FINRA’s multiple Codes of Arbitration Procedure. Recent rule 
changes in the arbitration area approved by the SEC are further evidence of this 
active regulation.238 
 
 233.  See supra Parts II.A-II.C. 
 234.  Exchange Act, § 15(o), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(o); see also supra note 149 and 
accompanying text. 
 235.  This recent and clear expression of congressional intent to authorize the SEC to 
regulate customers’ PDAAs differentiates the Exchange Act from other statutes that courts 
have declined to view as a “contrary congressional command” overriding the FAA. See, e.g., 
CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 673 (2012) (Credit Repair Organizations 
Act); Johnson v. West Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 374-75 (3d Cir. 2000) (Truth in 
Lending Act). 
 236.  See FINRA R. 2268; see also Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 
226-27 (1987) (“In the exercise of its regulatory authority, the SEC has specifically approved 
the arbitration procedures of . . . the NASD.”). 
 237.  Dodd-Frank § 964 requires the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to 
review SEC oversight of FINRA and specifically refers to arbitration services. The GAO 
issued its first report in May 2012, see generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 
12-625, SECURITIES REGULATION: OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO IMPROVE SEC’S OVERSIGHT OF 
THE FINANCIAL INDUSTRY REGULATORY AUTHORITY (discussing SEC oversight of arbitration 
program and noting that inspections have not been conducted as frequently as planned). 
 238.  See, e.g., Order Approving a Proposed Rule Change Raising the Limit for 
Simplified Arbitration from $25,000 to $50,000, 77 Fed. Reg. 27262 (May 9, 2012); Notice 
of Filing of Amendment No. 1 and Order Granting Accelerated Approval of a Proposed Rule 
Change to Amend the Code of Arbitration Procedure for Industry Disputes to Preclude 
Collective Action Claims From Being Arbitrated, 77 Fed. Reg. 22374 (Apr. 13, 2012) 
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Third, conflict between FINRA rules and the FAA is not only possible, it 
has happened in the context of the Schwab dispute. First, the FAA mandates 
enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms, whereas 
FINRA Rule 2268—which requires member firms to preserve the class action 
remedy for investors239—precludes Schwab from enforcing its arbitration 
agreement with its customers as written.240 Additionally, FINRA Rule 12204 
prescribes the manner in which customers can bring and participate in class 
actions against member firms, and Rules 12312-14 empower arbitrators to 
consolidate claims.241 Therefore, FINRA forum rules, which clearly permit 
class actions in court and joinder of claims in arbitration to further the statute’s 
underlying purpose of investor protection, conflict with Schwab’s class and 
consolidated action waiver. This conflict also satisfies McMahon’s requirement 
that the opponent of arbitration demonstrate “an inherent conflict between 
arbitration and the [Exchange Act’s] underlying purpose.”242 
It is possible, and perhaps preferable, to find no conflict between the FAA 
and the FINRA rules at issue. Unlike the Montana statute held invalid in 
Cassarotto, which required a warning about arbitration and thus reflects anti-
arbitration bias, the FINRA rules at issue are intended to make investors aware 
of the “existence, nature, and effect of PDAAs”243 and to improve SRO 
arbitration so that it is a “fair, expeditious, and economical means for resolution 
 
[hereinafter Collective Action Approval Order]; see also Gross, supra note 24, at 514-17 
(describing SEC’s robust oversight of frequent FINRA Dispute Resolution rule changes). 
 239.  In approving Rule 2268, the SEC explicitly declared that it intended the rule to 
preserve the class action in court as a remedy for investors. See supra note 173 and 
accompanying text. 
 240.  Because Rule 2268, by its terms, applies only to firms’ agreements with their 
customers, courts have upheld class action waivers in broker-dealers’ agreements with their 
employees. See Suschil v. Ameriprise Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 1:07CV2655, 2008 WL 974045, 
at *5-6 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 7, 2008); Lewis v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., 818 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 
1168 (N.D. Cal. 2011); Dauod v. Ameriprise Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 8:10-cv-00302-
CJC(MANx), 2011 WL 6961586, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2011); Cohen v. UBS Fin. Serv., 
Inc., 12 Civ. 2147 (BSJ) (JLC), 2012 WL 6041634 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2012). At least two 
courts rejected the argument that Rule 13204 of the Code of Arbitration Procedure for 
Industry Disputes barred a class action waiver in a member firm’s employment agreement. 
See Suschil, 2008 WL 974045, at *6 (reasoning that the phrase “[t]his paragraph does not 
otherwise affect the enforceability of any rights under the Code or any other agreement” 
precluded any argument that Rule 13204 barred broker-dealers from separately agreeing 
with their customers to waive their class action rights); Cohen, 2012 WL 6041634, at *3. 
FINRA, however, recently reaffirmed its position that “access to courts for class or 
collective action litigation should be preserved for associated persons.” Notice of Filing of 
Proposed Rule Change to Amend the Code of Arbitration Procedure for Industry Disputes to 
Preclude Collective Action Claims From Being Arbitrated, 77 Fed. Reg. 1773, 1774 (Jan. 
11, 2012). 
 241.  See supra notes 171-74, 176-77 and accompanying text. 
 242.  Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226-27 (citing Mitsubishi 
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628, 632-37 (1985)). 
 243.  Proposed Rule Change Relating to Predispute Arbitration Clauses in Customer 
Agreements, 54 Fed. Reg. 15,860 (Apr. 12, 1989). 
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of disputes,”244 taking into account the interests of investors, broker-dealers 
and the public. These SEC-approved FINRA rules reflect concern for 
arbitration’s fairness rather than anti-arbitration bias. Indeed, the SEC 
expressed its support for SRO arbitration at the time of McMahon.245 In 
contrast, the FAA’s underlying purpose is to eliminate laws that demonstrate an 
anti-arbitration bias.246 Under this interpretation, the FINRA rules still prevail. 
A court could apply FINRA rules as written because they do not “stand as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives.”247 
As for the fourth Credit Suisse factor—the type of conduct sought to be 
regulated—resolution of disputes and investor protection is at the core of the 
relationship between customers and broker-dealers, which the Exchange Act 
clearly intended to regulate.248 Congress understood that investor confidence 
was essential for the maintenance of effective securities markets and that 
market forces alone could not ensure adequate investor protection.249 This is 
particularly the case with respect to the broker-dealer industry since it performs 
activities that are essential to the securities markets.250 Moreover, the 
confidence of retail investors in securities markets is highly dependent on their 
trust and confidence in the broker-dealers and their associated members with 
 
 244.  E.g., NASD Notice to Members 89-21, supra note 119. The Ruder Report, for 
example, found that arbitration is preferable to civil litigation and recommends additional 
uniform “investor-friendly” provisions because PDAAs are generally not the result of arm’s 
length negotiations. RUDER REPORT, supra note 118, at 7-8. 
 245.  See Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners, Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (No. 
86-44), 1986 WL 727882, at *13 (arguing that 1975 enhancements to Commission’s 
authority to regulate SRO arbitration renders it “adequate to enforce substantive duties under 
the securities laws”). 
 246.  AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011) (“The FAA 
was enacted in 1925 in response to widespread judicial hostility to arbitration agreements.”); 
see also Hiro N. Aragaki, Arbitration’s Suspect Status, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1233 (2011); Hiro 
N. Aragaki, Equal Opportunity for Arbitration, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1189 (2011) (collectively, 
theorizing that Court’s FAA preemption jurisprudence is animated by an anti-discrimination 
principle and that the FAA prohibits laws that discriminate against arbitration). In any event, 
to the extent that Congress may have demonstrated an anti-arbitration bias in enacting 
§15(o), that recent expression of policy supersedes the FAA. 
 247.  AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1748. 
 248.  Even under the slightly more stringent standards of the traditional implied repeal 
test, the SEC’s statutory and regulatory authority over PDAAs would strongly support an 
implied repeal of the FAA. The facts would be difficult to distinguish from United States v. 
National Association of Securities Dealers, 422 U.S. 694 (1975), which also upheld rules 
promulgated by non-governmental entities and approved by the SEC in an area where 
Congress subsequently gave an explicit grant of regulatory discretion. See supra notes 213-
16 and accompanying text. 
 249.  SEC SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 100, at 153 (explaining the importance of 
protecting investors through uniform minimum standards of competence, experience, 
character and capital). 
 250.  Id. at 237 (describing “fiduciary and quasi-fiduciary obligations” that broker-
dealers owe to deal fairly with the public). 
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whom they conduct business; believing that their brokers are treating them 
fairly is an essential component of investor trust and confidence.251 As a result, 
active regulation of the dispute resolution forum used to resolve virtually all 
customer-broker disputes affects “practices that lie squarely within an area of 
financial market activity that the securities law seeks to regulate.”252 
In our view, therefore, Congress’ delegation of power to the SEC and 
FINRA to regulate all aspects of the broker-dealer industry, found in Exchange 
Act § 15A, including specifically PDAAs in Exchange Act § 15(o), displaces 
the expression of national policy embodied in the FAA to enforce arbitration 
agreements in accordance with their terms. In short, brokerage firms should not 
be able to invoke the FAA to justify their removal of investors’ class action 
remedy when conflicting FINRA rules mandate that customers have access to 
that remedy. 
5. Deference to SEC as an administrative agency 
To the extent there is any ambiguity as to whether FINRA’s rules bar class 
action waivers in customer agreements, courts should give substantial 
deference to the SEC’s interpretation of its own rule-making authority and 
FINRA’s interpretation of its Commission-approved rules.253 
Courts give substantial deference to an administrative agency’s 
interpretation of an ambiguous statute254 as well as an administrative rule that 
interprets the issuing agency’s own ambiguous regulation.255 An agency 
interpreting an ambiguous statute may receive substantial deference if 
“Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying 
the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was 
promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”256 Under the Chevron deference 
 
 251.  POSER & FANTO, supra note 98, at 1-5 (explaining that “[i]f ordinary investors 
come to believe that securities investing and trading benefit only insiders, the consequences 
could be disastrous for the capital markets”). 
 252.  Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 275-76 (2007). 
 253.  See Roberta S. Karmel, Should Securities Industry Self-Regulatory Organizations 
Be Considered Government Agencies?, 14 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 151, 152 (2008) (arguing 
that when FINRA exercises its investigative and disciplinary functions it should be viewed 
as a government agency); cf. AXA Distributors, LLC v. Bullard, 1:08-CV-188-WKW, 2008 
WL 5411940, at *8 n.20 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 24, 2008) (FINRA’s interpretations of its own 
regulations “factor into the analysis”). But see Morgan Keegan & Co. v. Johnson, 
2:11CV502, 2011 WL 7789796, at *7 (E.D. Va. Dec. 22, 2011) (FINRA’s interpretation of 
its arbitration rules is not entitled to Chevron deference because FINRA is a non-
governmental agency and its regulations are not mandated by federal law). 
 254.  See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–45 
(1984). 
 255.  See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461–63 (1997). 
 256.  United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001). Otherwise, the 
interpretation is “entitled to respect” only to the extent it has the “power to persuade.” 
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
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test, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the 
question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute.”257 
Ultimately, courts determine the degree of deference based on the 
circumstances of each case, considering factors such as the degree of the 
agency’s care, its consistency, formality, relative expertness, and the 
persuasiveness of its position.258 If the agency’s action carries the force of law, 
then it is entitled to deference. An agency’s authority to engage in adjudication 
or “notice and comment” rulemaking, defined in the Administrative Procedure 
Act (5 U.S.C. § 553), is a strong indication that Congress intended the agency 
to create rules that carry the force of law.259 Deference may be broadened when 
the regulation concerns “a complex and highly technical regulatory program” in 
which the identification and classification of relevant “criteria necessarily 
require significant expertise and entail the exercise of judgment grounded in 
policy concerns.”260 
The Commission expressly stated that it enacted the predecessor to Rule 
2268 for the specific purpose of ensuring that investors have access to courts 
for class action claims.261 In its approval order, the Commission noted that the 
new rule “will ensure that arbitration agreements clearly state the class action 
claims are specifically outside the scope of arbitration contracts entered into by 
members.”262 As discussed above, the SEC clearly had Congressional authority 
to act in this context.263 In determining a question of implied repeal in earlier 
cases, the Court stated that a “consistent and longstanding interpretation by the 
agency charged with administration of the Act [the SEC], while not controlling, 
is entitled to considerable weight.”264 Moreover, FINRA rules are approved by 
 
 257.  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. “The power of an administrative agency to 
administer a congressionally created . . . program necessarily requires the formulation of 
policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.” 
Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974). 
 258.  United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001). 
 259.  Id. at 234. 
 260.  Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 697 (1991); Thomas Jefferson 
Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994). 
 261.  Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Exclusion of Class 
Actions from Arbitration Proceedings, 57 Fed. Reg. 52,659, 52,661 (Nov. 4, 1992). 
 262.  Id. 
 263.  See supra notes 102-14 and accompanying text. The Court already has accorded 
Chevron deference to the Commission’s interpretation of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in 
insider trading cases. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 673 (1997); SEC v. Zandford, 
535 U.S. 813, 820 (2002). 
 264.  United States v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 719 (1975). To 
the extent that courts have declined to accord deference to other administrative agencies’ 
findings of implied repeal of the FAA, those decisions are distinguishable in the context of 
the SEC’s complex regulatory program. See Davis v. S. Energy Homes, Inc., 305 F.3d 1268, 
1280 (11th Cir. 2002) (declining to give Chevron deference to FTC’s interpretation of the 
MMWA on ground that FTC’s construction of the statute was not reasonable, and noting that 
BLACKGROSS_VOL 1 1_PRINT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/1/13 3:57 PM 
42 STANFORD JOURNAL OF COMPLEX LITIGATION [Vol. 1:1 
the SEC through “notice and comment” rule-making.265 Thus, courts should 
accord substantial deference to the Commission’s and FINRA’s view that 
FINRA Rule 2268 bars class action waivers in customer agreements. 
B. Exchange Act’s Specific Rules Displace the FAA’s General Mandate 
Another relevant canon of statutory construction provides that, in the 
context of interpreting and applying conflicting regulations, the more specific 
regulation trumps the general one.266 This rule applies when the difference 
between the specific and general rule is clear. It is also treated not as a firm rule 
of construction, but a factor often considered among other matters of fairness 
and conflict in order to determine exemptions.267 Pursuant to this canon of 
construction, any SEC or SRO rules affecting PDAAs would likely be 
controlling following the passage of Exchange Act § 15(o)268 and the 
amendment of Exchange Act § 29(a) to include SRO rules.269 The relevant 
language of the Exchange Act is more specific than any portion of the FAA that 
would apply to the Schwab agreement. This specific language in the Exchange 
Act accompanied by precise SRO rules would likely be enforced rather than the 
general mandates of the FAA. 
Furthermore, the regulators devising these specific rules have far more 
expertise in this complex area than the generalist pronouncements of the 
Supreme Court interpreting the FAA. As we have described, the SEC and 
FINRA have, since McMahon, engaged in an ongoing examination and revision 
of the SRO arbitration process and its rules to meet the needs of investors, 
broker-dealers and the general public. Their rulemaking has been guided by 
two realities: (1) virtually all customers’ disputes with their brokers are 
resolved in the SRO forum, and (2) investors’ trust and confidence in their 
brokers is paramount to maintaining strong capital markets. Accordingly, the 
federal regulators, based on their understanding of the industry, have 
determined that some investors’ claims can be better handled if aggregated. If 
 
courts are split on the issue); LaVoice v. UBS Fin. Serv., Inc., 11 CIV. 2308 BSJ JLC, 2012 
WL 124590 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2012) (declining to give Chevron deference to D.R. Horton, 
357 NLRB No. 184 (Jan. 3, 2012)). But see Jonathan D. Grosberg, The Magnuson-Moss 
Warranty Act, the Federal Arbitration Act, and the Future of Consumer Protection, 93 
CORNELL L. REV. 659 (2008) (arguing that courts should give substantial deference to the 
Federal Trade Commission’s view that the MMWA precludes binding arbitration in 
settlement procedures governed by the MMWA). 
 265.  The Schwab district court found that FINRA rules carry the force of law for 
deference purposes. Charles Schwab & Co. v. Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. Inc., 861 F. 
Supp. 2d 1063 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
 266.  See, e.g., Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384-85 (1992); 
Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 170 (2007). 
 267.  See Chickasaw Nation v. U.S., 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001). 
 268.  15 U.S.C. § 78o(o) (Supp. V 2011). 
 269.  See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
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there are a discrete number of similar claims, FINRA permits joinder in the 
arbitration forum; if, however, claims can be better handled in a class action, 
FINRA has determined that investors should have the opportunity to present 
these claims in court. The SEC has approved FINRA’s judgment that fair 
treatment and investor protection require that investors should have access to 
courts for class actions. 
The Supreme Court, in contrast, is a generalist body that articulated, in 
AT&T Mobility, a broad national policy in favor of individual arbitration that at 
least some commentators believe is not in tune with practical realities.270 Yet, 
in previous challenges to SRO arbitration policies, the court deferred to the 
federal regulators’ expertise. In Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton,271 
the Court upheld the power of arbitrators to award punitive damages, although 
the customer agreement had a New York choice of law clause and New York 
law at that time did not permit arbitrators to award punitive damages. Similarly, 
in Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,272 the Court held that arbitration 
panels, and not the courts, had the power to decide whether a SRO time 
limitation for bringing claims had expired. In both instances, the Court 
supported the SRO’s position in the face of plausible contract arguments to the 
contrary.273 It is true that deference to FINRA policies was, in those cases, 
consistent with the Court’s pro-arbitration policy, while deference to FINRA 
policy in the Schwab case could be viewed as inconsistent with AT&T 
Mobility’s support for the class action waiver. Nevertheless, we submit that 
there is nothing in AT&T Mobility that establishes that class action waivers are 
enforceable notwithstanding federal regulators’ determination that they are 
contrary to the public interest in a particular context. 
Indeed, we recognize that the balancing of policy interests may well be 
different in other contexts. The importance of investors’ trust and confidence in 
their broker-dealer relationships may not be applicable in other commercial 
relationships like the wireless service contract in AT&T Mobility. Accordingly, 
it would be unfortunate if the Court’s unwavering support for the FAA to date 
is construed to prohibit federal regulators, acting pursuant to Congressional 
authority, from taking into account important policy considerations in 
constructing the appropriate dispute resolution system to deal with matters 
within their field of expertise. 
 
 270.  Lawrence A. Cunningham, Rhetoric Versus Reality in Arbitration Jurisprudence: 
How the Supreme Court Flaunts and Flunks Contracts, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 129, 
144 (2012) (asserting that “[t]he Court commits contradictions that manifest a lack of 
understanding of contract law and even life”). Professor Cunningham argues that there is a 
rhetoric-reality gap between the Court’s incantations about arbitration as contract and the 
reality that the Court is promoting a particular form of arbitration over other methods of 
dispute resolution. 
 271.  514 U.S. 52 (1995). 
 272.  537 U.S. 79 (2002). 
 273.  Cunningham, supra note 270, at 138, 148-49. 
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C. Arguments Not Limited to the Broker-Dealer Context 
Thus far, we have focused on the dispute between FINRA and Schwab 
over the firm’s prohibition against aggregating claims and have demonstrated 
how the SEC and FINRA’s authority under the Exchange Act to prohibit the 
firm’s contract term displaces contrary policy under the FAA. As previously 
noted, there have also been recent efforts to amend governance documents of 
publicly traded issuers to require arbitration and prohibit aggregation of 
claims.274 The SEC opposed these corporate governance maneuvers on the 
ground that they would violate the federal securities laws. The SEC clearly 
took the position that, the FAA notwithstanding, the securities laws it was 
empowered to enforce prohibited public entities from inserting provisions in 
governance documents that would weaken investors’ rights and remedies. 
In this section we set forth additional arguments under the Exchange Act 
and the FAA that are broadly applicable to void any purported class-action 
waiver under the federal securities laws. 
1. The Exchange Act’s anti-waiver provision 
An additional argument for the displacement of the FAA by the Exchange 
Act in the Schwab dispute that is applicable outside the context of broker-
dealer regulation is also based on Exchange Act § 29(a): a securities class-
action waiver violates the anti-waiver provisions of the federal securities laws 
because the waiver effectively amounts to the loss of the individual investors’ 
private remedy. As the McMahon majority stated, Exchange Act § 29(a) “is 
concerned with whether the agreement ‘weakens [customers’] ability to recover 
under the Exchange Act.’”275 It is well-established that § 29(a), as amended by 
Dodd-Frank, does not permit provisions that weaken investors’ ability to 
recover under the federal securities laws, including FINRA rules, no matter 
what form they take.276 Schwab’s combination of a PDAA, a class action 
waiver and a prohibition on combining claimants with similar claims means 
that the only remedy available to every customer is an individual claim, 
 
 274.  See supra notes 37-50 and accompanying text. 
 275.  Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 230 (1987) (quoting 
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953)). 
 276.  See, e.g., McMahan & Co. v. Wherehouse Entm’t, Inc., 65 F.3d 1044 (2d Cir. 
1995) (analyzing a no-action clause in indenture); AES Corp. v. Dow Chemical Co., 325 
F.3d 174 (3d Cir. 2003) (considering a non-reliance clause in stock purchase agreement); 
Vacold LLC v. Cerami, 545 F.3d 114, 122 (2d Cir. 2008) (addressing a release in stock 
purchase agreement); Special Transp. Servs., Inc. v. Balto, 325 F. Supp. 1185 (D. Minn. 
1971) (considering a clause providing for alternative remedy); Citibank v. Itochu Int’l, Inc., 
01 CIV. 6007 (GBD), 2003 WL 1797847 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2003) (analyzing a clause 
specifying indemnification as sole remedy); Anglo-German Progressive Fund, Ltd. v. 
Concorde Group, Inc., 09 CIV 8708 PKC, 2010 WL 3911490 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2010) 
(addressing a merger clause). 
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however small the amount. Schwab’s judgment that this is an adequate 
remedy277 is not shared by the SEC, FINRA or academic commentary.278 
Similarly, the proposals to include class action waivers in corporate governance 
documents also serve to eliminate, as a practical matter, remedies for investors 
with small federal securities claims. The high costs of pursuing federal 
securities claims means that, unless a class-wide remedy is available, there is, 
as a practical matter, no remedy for investors with small holdings. A class 
action waiver in this context is the equivalent of a surrender of investor 
protections prohibited by the anti-waiver provisions. 
Ironically, Congress confirmed the importance of the federal securities 
class action in the PSLRA, legislation that came about largely through the 
lobbying efforts of the business community. The PSLRA sought to weed out 
frivolous suits through a variety of procedural and other measures, in lieu of 
eliminating federal securities class actions altogether, as business interests 
urged.279 In choosing to cure, but not to eliminate the securities class action, 
Congress determined that a collective-action remedy is necessary for investor 
protection, especially retail investors.280 In the PSLRA, Congress thus 
confirmed the importance of the federal securities class action to the integrity 
of the U.S. capital markets.281 
2. The class action waiver is unenforceable because investors cannot 
 vindicate their statutory rights 
In addition to arguments grounded in the Exchange Act’s specific 
language, arguments based on the Court’s FAA jurisprudence also support 
 
 277.  Charles Schwab & Co., Inc.’s Notice of Motion and Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Charles Schwab & Co., 
Inc.’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 3-4, Charles Schwab & Co. v. Fin. Indus. 
Regulatory Auth., Inc., (No. C-12-00518 EDL) 2012 WL 1408607 (stating that Schwab 
inserted the class action waiver after AT&T Mobility, “to protect its shareholders and 
customers from the high costs and inefficiencies associated with customer class actions” and 
“mindful of the fact that FINRA Dispute Resolution provides a successful arbitration forum 
for customers, including simplified arbitration for small claims”). 
 278.  See supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text; see also Gross, supra note 17 
(arguing that small claims arbitration, which is primarily a document-based hearing, lacks 
procedural justice). 
 279.  For a brief description of the key provisions, see DONNA M. NAGY, RICHARD W. 
PAINTER & MARGARET V. SACHS, SECURITIES LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT CASES AND 
MATERIALS 10 (3d ed. 2012). 
 280.  See H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730 
(Conf. Rep.) (“The private securities litigation system is too important to the integrity of 
American capital markets to allow this system to be undermined by those who seek to line 
their own pockets by bringing abusive and meritless lawsuits.”). 
 281.  Id. In 1998 Congress reaffirmed the national importance of the reformed federal 
securities fraud class action and enacted the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998), which preempts most class actions filed 
under state common law and state securities statutes. 
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voiding Schwab’s class action waiver. Challengers to Schwab’s class action 
waiver can also argue that it is unenforceable under the “vindicating statutory 
rights” doctrine. Under this doctrine, derived from the Supreme Court’s 
pronouncement in Mitsubishi282 that “so long as the prospective litigant 
effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the 
[federal] statute [providing that cause of action] will continue to serve both its 
remedial and deterrent function,” a disputant can argue that an arbitration 
agreement is unenforceable because an unfair aspect of the arbitration process 
would preclude that party from vindicating its statutory rights.283 Proposals to 
include class action waivers in corporate governance documents are similarly 
unenforceable under Mitsubishi. 
Lower courts have applied this doctrine post-AT&T Mobility to void class 
action waivers in non-securities contexts. For example, in In re American 
Express Merchants’ Litigation,284 a purported class action arising under federal 
antitrust laws, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reconsidered, in light of 
AT&T Mobility, its prior decisions that a class action waiver clause in a credit 
card agreement was unenforceable under the FAA285 because “enforcement of 
the clause would effectively preclude any action seeking to vindicate the 
[plaintiffs’] statutory rights.”286 The Court of Appeals found that AT&T 
Mobility did not alter its prior analysis, which rested on a different ground than 
AT&T Mobility.287 Rather, the Court of Appeals recognized, “[h]ere. . .our 
holding rests squarely on a ‘vindication of statutory rights analysis, which is 
part of the federal substantive law of arbitrability.’”288 Because plaintiffs 
demonstrated through expert testimony that pursuing their statutory claims 
individually, as opposed to through class arbitration, would not be 
economically feasible, thereby “effectively depriving plaintiffs of the statutory 
 
 282.  Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 
(1985). 
 283.  See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 92 (2000) (recognizing 
in dicta that, if a party showed that pursuing its statutory claims through arbitration would be 
prohibitively expensive, and thus it could not vindicate its statutory rights, a court could 
validly refuse to enforce a PDAA). 
 284.  See In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2012) (Amex III), 
cert. granted sub nom. American Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S.Ct. 594 
(2012). 
 285.  See In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 634 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2011) (Amex II); In 
re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 554 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 2009) (Amex I). The Court of Appeals 
reconsidered Amex I in light of the Supreme Court’s subsequent ruling in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. 
v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). 
 286.  Amex I, 554 F.3d at 304. 
 287.  See Amex III, 667 F.3d at 214 (“What Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion do not do is 
require that all class-action waivers be deemed per se enforceable. That leaves open the 
question presented on this appeal: whether a mandatory class action waiver clause is 
enforceable even if the plaintiffs are able to demonstrate that the practical effect of 
enforcement would be to preclude their ability to bring federal antitrust claims.”). 
 288.  Id. at 213 (quoting Amex I, 554 F.3d at 320). 
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protections of the antitrust laws,”289 the Second Circuit directed the district 
court to deny defendant’s motion to compel arbitration.290 
Schwab customers could argue that the class action and joinder waiver in 
their PDAA precludes their ability to effectively bring claims arising under the 
Exchange Act against Schwab. Scholars and practitioners alike concur that, 
absent the class action mechanism, disputants aggrieved through misconduct by 
an entity with superior bargaining power—although in small amounts 
individually but large amounts collectively—have no legal remedy that is 
economically feasible to pursue.291 In the context of securities fraud class 
 
 289.  Id. at 217. 
 290.  Id. at 219-20; see also Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 10 Civ. 6950 
(LBS) (JCF), 2011 WL 2671813, at *3 (S.D.N.Y July 7, 2011) (refusing to reconsider its 
holding in a Title VII action that an arbitration clause was unenforceable because plaintiffs 
would not be able to vindicate their statutory rights absent the availability of class 
proceedings and distinguishing AT&T Mobility); Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 10 Civ. 
3332, No. 10 Civ. 3332 (KMW) (MHD), 2012 WL 130420, at *12-14 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 
2012) (reaffirming earlier invalidation of an employment agreement waiver that would have 
precluded putative FLSA collective litigation because it would “operate as a waiver of 
Sutherland’s right to pursue her statutory remedies pursuant to FLSA”); In re Elec. Books 
Antitrust Litig., No. 11 MD 2293 (DLC), 2012 WL 2478462, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 2012) 
(denying motion to compel arbitration of antitrust claims pursuant to arbitration clause with 
class action waiver under vindicating rights doctrine). But see Homa v. Am. Express Co., 
No. 11-3600, 2012 WL 3594231 (3d Cir. Aug. 22, 2012) (finding that AT&T Mobility 
requires enforcing the class waiver provision even though plaintiff established that 
individual arbitration would not vindicate his statutory rights). 
 291.  Judge Craig Smith & Judge Eric V. Moyé, Outsourcing American Civil Justice: 
Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Employment Contracts, 44 TEX. TECH L. 
REV. 281, 295 (2012) (AT&T Mobility “sounds a death knell for consumer class actions . . . . 
Alone, these small-dollar claims appear insignificant and are far less likely to see their day in 
court. In its decision, the Court acknowledged this concern and did not dispute its 
seriousness; however, it did not find these concerns sufficient to protect in the face of the 
stated controlling policy”); Jean Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion 
Impedes Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 704 (2012) (“It is highly ironic but no less 
distressing that a case with a name meaning ‘conception’ should come to signify death for 
the legal claims of many potential plaintiffs.”); S.I. Strong, Does Class Arbitration ‘Change 
the Nature’ of Arbitration? Stolt-Nielsen, AT&T and a Return to First Principles, 17 HARV. 
NEGOT. L. REV. 201 (2012); Ann Marie Tracey & Shelley McGill, Seeking a Rational 
Lawyer for Consumer Claims After the Supreme Court Disconnects Consumers in AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 435, 435-36 (2012) (“[The] Court 
essentially eliminated one of the few methods, if not the only method, that consumers have 
to adjudicate legitimate claims that likely could not or would not be brought on an individual 
basis. This decision insulates companies from any meaningful liability that may result from 
poor practices or even fraudulent schemes.”); Sarah Cole, Continuing the Discussion of the 
AT&T v. Concepcion Decision: Implications for the Future, ADR PROF BLOG (Apr. 27, 
2011), http://www.indisputably.org/?p=2312 (“It would appear that the era of class 
arbitration is over before it really ever began—unless Congress can be persuaded to amend 
the FAA to permit class arbitration, at least in cases involving low value claims, where 
consumers are unlikely to have practical recourse to a remedy through traditional bilateral 
arbitration.”); Marcia Coyle, Divided Justices Back Mandatory Arbitration for Consumer 
Complaints, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 28, 2011 (quoting a lawyer for the Concepcions, stating “‘[t]he 
decision will make it harder for people with civil rights, labor, consumer and other kinds of 
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arbitration, the Second Circuit’s analysis in Amex III is even more compelling. 
Based on the need to use experts to establish elements such as causation, 
reliance and damages,292 the costs of proving a federal securities fraud claim in 
arbitration would be so large as to make pursuing an individual claim infeasible 
except possibly for large investors that have suffered significant losses. Thus, 
individual investors can establish that, under Mitsubishi, an arbitration clause 
with a class action waiver is not enforceable because they would not be able to 
vindicate their statutory rights in individualized, small claims arbitration. 
CONCLUSION 
Persuasive statutory, legal and policy reasons support the contention that 
Schwab cannot seek refuge in the FAA to force its customers to waive their 
rights to pursue a class action or consolidated arbitration against the firm. 
Schwab’s efforts to effectively immunize itself from liability against individual 
retail customers for misconduct impacting more than one customer at a time 
contradicts existing statutory protections for investors found throughout the 
Exchange Act. Congress’ more recent and quite specific pronouncement 
combined with its delegation of rule-making authority over broker-dealers to 
the SEC—which is uniquely situated in a complex regulatory environment with 
the requisite expertise to exercise sound judgment and devise policies and rules 
to further its statutory mandate of investor protection—displaces the Supreme 
Court’s general pronouncement that arbitration agreements should be enforced 
according to their terms. This general pronouncement is not absolute: 
exceptions abound for, inter alia, contrary Congressional commands, common 
law contract defenses applicable to all contracts, and agreements that do not 
permit disputants to vindicate their statutory rights. While AT&T Mobility 
empowers courts to preempt state laws displaying anti-arbitration bias, and 
CompuCredit permits the arbitrability of statutory claims in the absence of 
conflicting federal regulations, no authority exists for the astounding 
proposition that Schwab has advanced: that the FAA limits the ability of federal 
regulators acting pursuant to authority under Exchange Act to impose 
conditions and limitations on the use of arbitration provisions in customer 
agreements in order to protect investors and ensure fairness. 
At its core, reconciling conflicting federal statutes boils down to distilling 
Congressional intent. Congress has not yet passed a law banning predispute 
arbitration agreements in most consumer PDAAs, although it has given the 
 
claims that stem from corporate wrongdoing to join together to obtain their rightful 
compensation’” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 292.  See supra note 32 and accompanying text; Michael J. Kaufman, Regressing: The 
Troubling Dispositive Role of Event Studies in Securities Fraud Litigation, 15 STAN. J.L. 
BUS. & FIN. 183 (2009) (explaining the barriers to meritorious securities fraud litigation 
presented by the need for event studies prepared by qualified events). 
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matter serious consideration.293 Unless and until it does, AT&T Mobility 
fortifies class action waivers in consumer PDAAs against challenges under 
state laws. The assertion that AT&T Mobility extends to bar all challenges to 
class action waivers under federal regulatory statutes, however, is overbroad 
and does not withstand careful analysis under federal securities laws, perhaps 
other federal statutes, and canons of statutory construction. 
 
 293.  See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
